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ARGUING FOR AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN
DARFUR: THE CHALLENGES OF
COMPLEMENTARITY, ENFORCEMENT,
AND RELATED ISSUES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN* & NICHOLAS TYLER**
This Article addresses the evolution of the International Criminal
Court's case regardingDarfur, Sudan. In particular,the Article examines
the U.N. investigation into the human rights abuses in Darfur, the U.N.
referral of the Darfur case to the ICC, the ICC's Prosecutor own
investigation into the abuses, and the recent issuance of arrest warrants by
the ICC for particularDarfur suspects. In addition, the Article analyzes
whether the ICC complementarityprinciple is violated in the Sudan case as
a result of local judicial activity against the ICC suspects named in the
warrants. Concluding that the principle is not violated, and the ICC may
therefore proceed with its case against these suspects, the Article then
proposes an integrated approach to resolving the crisis in Darfur. This
approach entails ICC prosecutions, Sudanese prosecutions and a truth
commission process. Finally, the Article offers suggestions for executing
the ICC arrestwarrants in the Sudan.
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court's (ICC or Court) case regarding the
conflict in Darfur, Sudan sheds light on the development and meaning of
the complementariiy principle under the Rome Statute of the International
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The case also illustrates the difficulty of

enforcing ICC rulings in the territory of a non-State Party such as Sudan (a
non-State Party is any country that is not a member of the ICC). The
United Nations has mandated that non-State Parties, including Sudan and
surrounding nations, cooperate in the ICC case in Darfur; however, recent
events indicate that this case will present new challenges to this mandate. 2
This Article will address these challenges both in the context of
complementarity and in the context of enforcement of the recent ruling by
the ICC issuing arrest warrants for two particular Darfur suspects. Though
the Article ultimately concludes that the ICC's complementarity principle is
not violated in the case of the two named suspects in the warrants, and
hence the ICC may proceed with trying these suspects, it will offer
numerous suggestions for providing a role to institutions and actors both
within and outside of Sudan as part of an integrated approach to managing
the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
As a way of incorporating the concept of complementarity into a
solution for the Darfur crisis, the Article outlines such an approach,
providing a particular role to Sudanese actors and institutions, including the
Sudanese special courts, as well as a future truth commission. For example,
Sudanese special courts may be able to try some of the low-level criminals
involved in the Darfur crimes while the ICC focus its efforts on the leaders

Complementarity refers to the shared role between the ICC and the courts of national
jurisdictions, such as Sudan, in prosecuting crimes under the Rome Statute. Under the
complementarity principle, if national courts like those in Sudan are able and willing to
prosecute an individual for crimes covered by the Rome Statute, then the ICC must defer to
those national courts and refrain from initiating its own criminal proceedings against that
individual. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining the Rome Statute's
complementarity principle). If the ICC were to continue prosecuting an individual who the
national courts were both able and willing to prosecute, it would violate the complementarity
principle. The principle would not be violated, however, in the case of national courts that
lacked the capacity or willingness to prosecute a particular individual as a result of political
unrest or a non-independent judiciary. In this event, the ICC could continue its own
prosecution of this individual. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf.
Article 17
contains the Court's complementarity principle. Id. It establishes the guidelines under
which a case is to be evaluated for admissibility to the Court when the national jurisdiction
has undertaken concurrent, related proceedings. Id. Under Article 17, a case is inadmissible
before the ICC where a national jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting a concurrent
proceeding impartially and independently, and not for the purposes of shielding the
individual from criminal liability. Id. See infra note 43 for the relevant statutory provisions
of Article 17.
2 See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. Security Council Resolution
1593); see also infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing recent statements by
Sudanese government officials that reflect an unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC).
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of the human rights violations. A Sudanese truth commission could help
create a record of the atrocities while providing specific recommendations
that directly impact victims' lives in a post-conflict society.
In addition, a particular role for the U.N., the African Union (AU),
ICC Member States, and Interpol will be discussed in the context of
enforcement of the arrest warrants. If U.N. and AU troops currently in
Sudan can not be properly authorized to execute the arrest warrants, then an
ICC Member State may be able to execute the warrants with assistance
from Interpol.
The effect and outcome of the Darfur case related to these developing
issues of complementarity, enforcement, and integration bear serious
implications for the Court's future effectiveness and legitimacy.
This Article consists of four Parts examining the on-going Darfur case.
Part Two addresses background information related to the Darfur case,
including: (1) the history of the ICC; (2) the structure of the Court; (3) the
relevant substantive and procedural law; (4) the complementarity principle;
and (5) other ICC cases. Part Three analyzes the U.N.'s involvement in
Darfur, including the formation of the International Commission of Inquiry
in Darfur (Darfur Commission) the Darfur Commission's comprehensive
report, and the U.N. Security Council's referral of the case to the ICC. Part
Four consists of a review of the progress of the Darfur case in the ICC to
date, including the ICC Prosecutor's (Prosecutor) investigation in Darfur,
the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses (Application) for two
individuals allegedly involved in Darfur crimes, and the recent decision by
the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber to issue arrest warrants for these two
individuals. Part Five analyzes emerging issues presented by the evolution
of the Darfur case in the ICC, including the issues of complementarity,
enforcement, and integration.
II. BACKGROUND
In the past five years an internal conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan
has drawn major international attention because of the magnitude of impact
on the civilian populations within the implicated territory. Since the most
recent crisis began in Darfur, villages have been burned and looted,
thousands of people have been killed and raped, and millions have been
displaced from their homes.3 The severity of the conflict has placed
3 Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the InternationalCommission of Inquiry
on Darfur, § I(VI), delivered to the U.N. Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25,
2005)

[hereinafter Darfur Report], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases

/Report to UN on. Darfur.pdf. This is the report of the findings by the Commission
established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1564. S.C. Res. 1564, 12, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004). For further discussion of the Darfur Report and the
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urgency on bringing the perpetrators of the violence to justice and ending
the culture of impunity.
Recently, with the issuance of arrest warrants for two Darfur suspects
in the spring of 2007, the ICC's case relating to Sudan has once again
received international attention. 4 This attention, however, is nothing new as
the ICC's ongoing case in Darfur has presented a number of novel issues
that will impact the functioning of the Court in future cases. Darfur
represents the first time a case was referred to the ICC involving crimes
taking place in the territory of a State that is not a party to the ICC. 5 The
case also marks the first time the U.N. Security Council referred a case to
the ICC, as it is permitted to do under the Rome Statute.6 The Darfur case
is also unique because officials of a standing government are implicated in
the alleged crimes, rather than non-state actors. In other ICC cases,
individuals named in arrest warrants or otherwise made the focus of an
investigation were not government officials, but rather individual, private
actors. In contrast, one of the individuals named in the recently issued
arrest warrants in the Darfur case is a prominent official within the
Sudanese government. 7 This case is also the first time an investigation by
the ICC has been conducted in the midst of ongoing conflict. 8 And perhaps
Commission's findings, see infra notes 51-75 and accompanying text. See also Sixth Report
of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant
to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 5, delivered to the Security Council (Dec. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-RP-20071205-UNSC-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter
Sixth Report to the U.N. Security Council] ("In Darfur today, crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court continue to be committed. There are consistent reports of targeted attacks
against civilians, in particular against those 2.5 million people forcibly displaced into camps.
Persons displaced are subjected to persecution, abuses and violations of fundamental
rights-sexual violence, illegal detentions, unlawful killings, [and] looting.").
4 Maggie Farley, Warrants Issued in Darfur Conflict, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A3;
Marlise Simmons, Judges Charge 2 Top Sudanese with Atrocities in Darfur Area, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A10.
5 The two previous ICC cases were referred by State Parties. See infra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
6 S.C. Res. 1593,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also Rome Statute,
supra note 1, art. 13(b) (granting the Court jurisdiction where a situation has been referred
by the U.N. Security Council under its Chapter VII powers of the U.N. Charter).
7 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Ahmad Harun, one of the suspects named
in the arrest warrants, is the current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in the Sudan.
In the case of both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda, the individuals
named in the ICC arrest warrants are members of the military, or militia. See Press Release,
ICC, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders (Oct. 14, 2005), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/I 14.html; see also Press Release, ICC, Issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest Against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/1 33.html.
8 See Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur (June
6, 2005), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=107&l=en.html.
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most significantly, Darfur is the first ICC case in which a question of
complementarity has been raised as between the ICC's jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction of concurrently established national courts such as those in
Sudan. 9
A. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The ad hoc tribunal created in Nuremberg after World War II set a
precedent for the international community to hold individuals responsible
for grave crimes, even though state responsibility still maintained a role at
Nuremberg.10 The ad hoc criminal Tribunals established to address the
crises in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda continued the pattern of
holding individuals responsible for serious breaches of human rights law
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes."1
The

9 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl ("Emphasizing that the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions"); see also id. art. 1 ("An International Criminal Court... is hereby
established."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LACK OF CONVICTION: THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL
COURT ON THE EVENTS IN DARFUR 2 (2006), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder
/ij/sudan0606/sudan0606.pdf [hereinafter HRW Special Courts Assessment] ("On June 7,
2005, one day after the Prosecutor of the [ICC] announced he was opening investigations
into the events in Darfur, the Sudanese authorities established the Special Criminal Court on
the Events in Darfur (SCCED) to demonstrate the government's ability to handle
prosecutions domestically.").
10 See generally Frederic Megret, Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International
CriminalCourt's Third PartyJurisdictionand the Looming Revolution ofInternationalLaw,
12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 247 (2001). Nuremberg dictum stating "crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities" has been used to affirm individual criminal
responsibility for international crimes. Id. at 263 n.65 (citing The Trial of German Major
War Criminals Sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment (1946), 41-42).
11 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, arts. 1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. Article I states, "The International Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the
provisions of the present Statute." Id. art. I (emphasis added). Articles 2-5 contain
definitions for crimes within the jurisdiction, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. Id. arts. 2-5; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States, Between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31 Dec. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. Article 1 states:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present
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international community recognized, however, the need for a permanent
court for the trial of these transgressions, rather than the continual
establishment of ad hoc tribunals in response to each period of serious
human rights violations.12
In response to this demonstrated need, the international community
agreed on the idea of the ICC. The ICC was to be the first court established
in advance of, rather than in response to, international human rights
violations.1 3 In constructing the definitions of crimes that would fall within
the Court's jurisdiction, the international community relied upon the
statutes for the two regional criminal courts: the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 14
In July of 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted at the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International

Statute.

Id. art. 1 (emphasis added). Articles 2-4 define the related crimes within the jurisdiction. Id.
arts. 2-4.
12 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 385, 385 (2005). The ex post tribunals

benefited from their establishment after the particular conflict was resolved; the ICC, as a
permanent court, will deal with problems at times while they are still occurring. Id. at 385.
13Previous ad hoc "tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, may be called ex post tribunals,
in that they are established after the acute and violent situation in which the alleged crimes
occurred .... [E]x ante tribunals... are established before an international security
problem has been resolved or even manifested itself .... The ICC is the archetypal ex ante
tribunal." Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 12, at 2.
14 For example, Article 6 of the Rome Statute, defining genocide, contains text identical
to that of Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6
("' [G]enocide' means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such [listing relevant acts][.]") with
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4 ("Genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, ethnical, or religious group, as
such [listing relevant acts identical to ones listed in Article 6 of the Rome Statute]."). Also,
the text of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, defining crimes against humanity, parallels the text
of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute defining the same crime, with the exception of further
defined sex crimes in Section l(g) of Article 7 of the Rome Statute and the inclusion of the
crime of apartheid in Section 10) of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Compare Rome Statute,
supra note 1, art. 7, with ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 5. Furthermore, Article 8 of the
Rome Statute incorporates grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 into its
definition of war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. Similarly, the ICTR and ICTY
Statutes also criminalize grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. ICTR Statute, supra
note 11, art. 4 ("Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II"); ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 2 ("Grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949").
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Criminal Court, also known as the Rome Conference.1 5 On July 1, 2002,6
the Rome Statute entered into force after ratification by sixty State Parties.'
B. STRUCTURE
The International Criminal Court is comprised of the Presidency, an
Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber, the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Office of
the Prosecutor (Prosecutor's Office), and the Registry. 7 Judges are
nominated and confirmed by the Assembly of State Parties (Assembly), and
they are required to represent diverse geographic, gender, and legal
backgrounds. 8 The Prosecutor is also nominated and confirmed by the
Assembly. Critically, he or she has the independence to operate the
Prosecutor's Office as a separate organ of the Court.' 9 The Registry is
responsible for all non-judicial aspects of the Court, including the Victims
and Witnesses Unit that provides security and assistance for individuals
testifying before the Court. 20 Although independent of the U.N., the ICC
does have an agreement of cooperation with the U.N. whereby both parties
21
agree to exchange information and assist each other in various ways.

'5 The Rome Statute is an international treaty.

However, because it is a treaty that

establishes an institution, it is referred to as a statute.
16 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 126 ("This Statute shall enter into force on the first
day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations."). Following the adoption of the Rome Statute at the Rome Conference in 1998,
the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002 with the necessary number of countries having
deposited ratifications to the U.N. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, History of
the ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (last visited Sept. 9, 2008). On July 18,
2008, Cook Islands were added as the newest State Party to the Rome Statute, bringing the
total number of State Parties to 108. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, State
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, July 18, 2008, http://www.iccnow.org/documents
/RATIFICATIONSbyRegion_ 18July-08.pdf.
17 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 34.
18 Id. art. 36(7)-(8). The Assembly consists of one representative for each State Party.
Id. art. 112(1).
19Id. art. 42. The Prosecutor can be removed by a vote of the Assembly if there is
evidence of misconduct. Id. art. 46.
20 Id. art. 43.

21 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and
United Nations, Nov. 10, 2004, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools/.
The
negotiated agreement between the U.N. and the ICC is a basic agreement of mutual
acknowledgment of status. Both organs agree to the exchange of information and
cooperation in fulfilling their respective mandates. See U.N. Doc. A/58/874 (Aug. 20, 2004)
(General Assembly resolution ratifying the cooperation agreement). U.N. officials are also
permitted under the Agreement to testify before the Court if necessary. Id. art. 16.
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Funding is provided by the State Parties, the U.N., and donations from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private donors."
C. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW

The Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the Court to only "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. 23
Crimes within the Court's jurisdiction at the present time are genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 24 Additionally, the Court only
has jurisdiction over crimes that occurred after July 1, 2002, the date the
Rome Statute entered into force.25 The jurisdiction of the Court is also
limited to crimes either committed within the borders of States having
ratified the Rome Statute or committed by nationals of States having
ratified the Rome Statute.26

Cases can come before the Court in three different ways: referral by a
State Party, referral by the U.N. Security Council, and by referral of the
Prosecutor, with the latter known as "proprio motu initiatives. 27 For

example, the Darfur case was referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security

22

23
24

Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 115-16.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 5(1). In the future, the crime of aggression may fall within the Court's

jurisdiction; however, it is currently undefined in the Rome Statute. "The Court shall
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted... defining
the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction
with respect to the crime." Id. In other words, the Court cannot proceed with trying suspects
for the crime of aggression until a definition for aggression is agreed upon by the Assembly.
Id. art. 5(2). The crime of genocide, however, currently falls within the Court's jurisdiction:
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. art. 6. See also infra note 30 (providing definitions of crimes against humanity under the
Rome Statute); infra note 31 (defining war crimes).
25 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 1(1) ("The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.").
26 In the case of [State Party referrals or Prosecutor initiatives], the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3 [allowing States to accept such
jurisdiction]: (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or
aircraft; (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
Id. art. 12(2).
27 The proprio motu power allows the Prosecutor to review cases submitted by nongovernmental entities, id. art. 13; this power has yet to be utilized by the Prosecutor.
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Council. 28 The Prosecutor must submit proprio motu initiatives to the PreTrial Chamber for approval before initiating an investigation. 29 Regardless
of how a case is referred to the ICC, it must allege crimes defined in the
Rome Statute.
One important step the Rome Statute has taken is the listing of genderbased crimes in the definition of crimes against humanity under Article 7.30
Another important inclusion in the crimes covered by the Rome Statute is
the conduct of private, non-state actors, coverage of which sets the stage for
the Court to prosecute not only state-sponsored crimes, but also war crimes
by private actors occurring as part of an internal conflict.3' Importantly,
28 The referral of the ICC case in the Democratic Republic of Congo was received as a

State Party referral in the form of a letter to the Prosecutor. Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor
Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/19.html
[hereinafter Prosecutor
Receives Referral of the Situation in the DRC]. The ICC case in Uganda was also referred
to the Prosecutor in a letter as a State Party referral. Press Release, ICC, President of
Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29,
2004), available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id= I 6&l=en.html.
29 "If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of
an investigation, together with any supporting material collected." Rome Statute, supra note
1, art. 15(3).
30 "Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, [and] enforced
sterilization" were specifically included as crimes against humanity. Id. art. 7(1)(g).
For the purposes of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k)
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health.
Id. art. 7(1).
31 1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. 2. For the purpose
of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Willful killing; (ii) Torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments; (iii) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (v) Compelling a prisoner of war or
other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; (vi) Willfully depriving a
prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; (vii) Unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; (viii) Taking of hostages. (b) Other serious
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this allows for individual liability during an internal national conflict.32 In
addition, the principle of State sovereignty had previously provided
immunity to States and their actors from prosecution for internal actions,
because States and their actors were believed to have the right to conduct
themselves within their respective borders in whatever manner they saw
fit. 33 Thus, while the ICC represents a new and marked infringement on the

principle of State sovereignty, it limits its infringement to grave violations
of international criminal law.34
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the
established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: (i) Intentionally
directing attacks againstthe civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities; ...(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives; ...(xvi)
Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; ...(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate
actively in hostilities.

Id. art. 8(1), 8(2)(a)-(b); see also id. art. 8(2)(c)-(e) (defining war crimes in the context of
armed conflicts not of an international character). For further discussion of war crimes in
this particular context, see infra note 32.
32 The war crimes definition, incorporating Geneva Conventions of 1949, "applies to
armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or
other acts of a similar nature." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(d); see also id. art.
8(2)(c) (listing acts committed during armed conflicts not of an international character that
constitute war crimes). This adds a distinction between simple unrest within a State and
protracted armed conflict, which is the necessary predicate before the statutory war crimes
definition will apply to public and private actors involved in such an internal conflict. See
id. art. 8(2)(f).
[War crimes definition incorporating other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character] applies to armed conflicts that
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
Id. The Rome Statute also broke precedent from Nuremberg and the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes by allowing the following of superior orders as a defense in the Court unless the
order was manifestly unlawful. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 33(1)(c), with
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7(3). The Rome Statute defines acts of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity as "manifestly unlawful," however, meaning that a
subordinate in all likelihood could not rely upon the defense of "following orders" for these
crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 33; see also id. art. 8(c)-(f) (discussing capacity of
ICC to prosecute both State and non-State, or private, actors involved in internal, armed
conflicts).
33 The principle of State sovereignty was first established as customary international law
Treaty of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, available at
in the Peace of Westphalia.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
34 The jurisdiction of the ICC "shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1). Since 1945,
the international community could intervene for the serious crimes covered by the Rome
Statute pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, granting the U.N. Security Council power
to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
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The Court may also, in some cases, rely on the U.N. Security Council
to aid in enforcement of the Rome Statute, possibly through sanctions or
military actions. This reliance would be particularly appropriate where the
U.N. Security Council has passed a resolution referring a case to the ICC
under the Rome Statute as it did in Darfur.35 Additionally, the U.N.
Security Council has the ability to compel cooperation
of non-State Parties,
36
such as Sudan, in investigations by the ICC.
Once a case has proceeded to the investigation stage, it is the
responsibility of the Prosecutor's Office to conduct an independent and
comprehensive investigation of particular alleged crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction.3 7 In cases where there is strong evidence against an individual
or individuals, the Prosecutor may submit an application to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for the issuance of arrest warrants.3 8 On the basis of an arrest

aggression and [to] make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. Charter art. 39; see also infra note 41 for a discussion of these measures under Articles
41 and 42. In practice, the U.N. Security Council has used this power to intervene in internal
conflicts when they are viewed as potential threats to international peace and security. See
S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992) for an example of the U.N. Security
Council exercising Chapter 7 powers to establish a mission within an internal disturbance by
creating the United Nations Mission in Somalia. Note also that State Parties voluntarily
accept the Court's jurisdiction by ratifying the Rome Statute, thereby explicitly agreeing to
some infringement on their sovereign rights. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1). In
the case of actions referred by the U.N., a non-State Party and its actors may be made subject
to the Court's jurisdiction, as occurred with Sudan and its actors in the Darfur context. See
id. art. 13(b); see also id. art. 12(2) (applying the State Party jurisdictional requirements only
to actions referred by a State Party or the Prosecutor and not to actions referred by the U.N.
Security Council).
35The U.N. Security Council has used sanctions, rather than military force, as a tool to
compel compliance with prior resolutions. This was done recently in response to the
violations of North Korea in testing nuclear weapons. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1718 approved economic sanctions to be applied to North Korea by all U.N. Member States.
See S.C. Res. 1718, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2007).
36 See infra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining that Resolution 1593 requires
Sudan's cooperation in the ICC's investigation in Darfur). Some Rome Conference
participants raised questions about this power over non-State Parties and the expanded
jurisdiction it creates, believing that it violated the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and customary international law. PHILIPP MEI3NER, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT CONTROVERSY

35 (Transaction 2006). The portion of the Law of Treaties at issue

raised the question of whether a treaty between two or more States can require any action or
compliance by a non-signatory State. Id. The conclusion at the Rome Conference was that
the role of the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter-to maintain
security in the world-gives the Council the authority to compel cooperation regardless of
the signatory status of a non-State Party. Id.
37 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15, 42(1).
18 Id. art. 58(1) ("At any time after the initiation of an investigation,
the Pre-Trial
Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if,
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warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Court requests the State
having custody over the defendant to surrender that person to the Court so
the case may proceed.39 It is the responsibility of the State Party having
custody over the defendant to enforce the warrant. 40 When a non-State
Party, such as the Sudan, has custody, the U.N. Security Council may, upon
the ICC's request and using force if necessary, compel the non-State Party
to surrender a suspect to the Court.41
D. COMPLEMENTARITY
One of the most important and distinctive features of the ICC is the
complementarity regime provided in the Rome Statute.42 Under this
regime, the Court is intended to function solely as a court of last resort

having examined the application and the evidence or other information submitted by the
Prosecutor, it is satisfied that: (a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) The arrest of the person
appears necessary: (i) To ensure the person's appearance at trial, (ii) To ensure that the
person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings, or (iii)
Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that crime
or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the
same circumstances.").
39Id. art. 63 ("The accused shall be present during the trial.").
40 Id.art. 89(1) (noting that States are required to effect the arrest and surrender of a
suspect in accordance with their applicable national laws).
41 U.N. Charter ch. VII. Numerous articles within Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
authorize the U.N. Security Council to take various measures, including force if necessary,
to ensure international peace and security:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations.
Id. art. 41 (giving the U.N. Security Council sanctions power).
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.
Id. art. 42 (giving U.N. Security Council the power to use military force). Recall U.N.
Security Council referrals of cases to the ICC are themselves based upon Chapter VII
powers. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
42 This is a change from the ICTY precedent. "The International Tribunal shall have
primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may
formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in
" ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 9(2); see also
accordance with the present Statute ....
ICTR Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (stating that the ICTR "shall have primacy over the
national courts of all States").
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when courts of the national jurisdiction where crimes occurred are
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute those crimes.
Such a failure may stem, for example, from political instability in the
national jurisdiction or from a non-independent judiciary.4 3 If the courts of
the national jurisdiction are unwilling or unable to prosecute an individual
for a crime covered by the Rome Statute, the ICC can prosecute that
individual without violating the complementarity principle. However, if a
nation and its courts are able and willing to prosecute an individual for such
a crime, the ICC must defer to these national courts under the
complementarity principle. 4
E. OTHER ICC CASES
Since the Court's inception in 2002, State Parties have referred the
ICC's three other cases to the Prosecutor's Office. One case was referred
43 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a). The Statute says:
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article I [establishing the complementarity
principle], the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution .... In order to determine
unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due
process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5 [stating crimes in the Court's jurisdiction]; (b)
There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not
being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner
which, in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.
Id. art. 17(2)(a)-(c). In order to determine inability to investigate or prosecute in a particular
case, the Court considers whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of
its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. Id. art. 17(3).
44 Id. art. 17(2)(a)-(c). Article 20 contains the double-jeopardy principle, ne bis in idem,

prohibiting an individual from being tried by the ICC who was previously tried by a national
court for a crime involving the same conduct. Id. art. 20(1). There is an exception for cases
in which the national trial is conducted for the purpose of shielding the individual from
criminal liability, or is not conducted impartially or independently. Id. art. 20(3).
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6
[genocide], 7 [crimes against humanity], or 8 [war crimes] shall be tried by the Court with
respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with
the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner
which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.
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by Uganda, regarding crimes committed within its territory by non-State
militias.45 The investigation in Uganda has resulted in the issuance of five
arrest warrants by the Pre-Trial Chamber. One of the persons named in the
warrants has since died in combat; the other four have so far eluded capture,
most likely because the Ugandan government lacks the resources to capture
these suspects.46 The second case was referred by the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), 47 and also involved crimes committed within a State's
territory by a non-State militia leader. One of the suspects, Thomas
Lubanga, was the leader of a militia within the DRC and is charged with
conscripting children under the age of fifteen to militia service. In March
2006, the first successful arrest was made for prosecution in the ICC when
Lubanga was captured. In addition, two more arrest warrants were also
recently executed in the DRC for two additional suspects. 48 This DRC case
is currently pending before the ICC. Finally and most recently, at the
request of the government of the Central African Republic, the ICC has
begun an investigation in that country. One arrest warrant has been issued
by the ICC Prosecutor for crimes committed in the Central African
Republic; this warrant was executed on May 24, 2008. 49

45 See Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the DRC, supra note 28.
46

See Decision to Terminate Proceedings against Raska Lukwiya, Case No. ICC-02/04-

01/05, Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-Tr. Chamber, (July 11, 2007) (Pre-Trial Chamber decision to
terminate proceedings based on the death of Raska Lukwiya); Press Release, ICC, Warrant
of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders, supra note 7 (discussing warrants for
arrest issued by the ICC for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo,
and Dominic Ongwen of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda).
47 Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the DRC, supra note 28.
48 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. The arrest of Lubanga was pursuant to the
arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber on February 10, 2006. See Situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo), Case No. ICC-01/0401/06-2, Intl. Crim. Ct., Pre-Tr. Chamber I, (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-2_- tEnglish.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) ("Having
found that... there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is
criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for: (i) the war crime of enlisting
children under the age of fifteen punishable under article 8(2)(b)(vii) of the Statute; (ii) the
war crime of conscription of children under the age of fifteen punishable under article
8(2)(xxvi) or article 8 (2)(e)(vii) of the Statute; and (iii) the war crime of using children
under the age of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities punishable under article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) or article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute."); see also Press Release, ICC, First Arrest
for the International Criminal Court (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=132.html. (official announcement of the arrest of Lubanga
by the Court).
49 Press Release, ICC, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Arrested for Alleged Crimes in Central
African Republic (May 24, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases
/370.html.
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III. U.N. INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR
A. U.N. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

In September of 2004, the U.N. Security Council responded to the
violation of a ceasefire agreement between the government of Sudan and
rebel groups by mandating that a commission investigate the situation in
Darfur with urgency. 50 The U.N. formed the Darfur Commission to
investigate the alleged violations of international law then occurring in
Darfur and to recommend a response to the conflict.
The Darfur
Commission transmitted its Report to the U.N. Secretary-General in
January 2005 pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1564.51
The findings of the Commission are comprehensive, examining all
parties involved in the on-going conflict and the long-term historical
background behind it. The primary parties involved in the armed conflict in
Darfur are: (1) the Sudanese government and its associated organizations;
(2) the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM!A); and (3) the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM).5 2 The SLM/A and JEM are armed resistance
movements participating in attacks on Sudanese government installations in
an effort to undermine the central government's local authority and to
acquire weapons for use in combat.53 The government of Sudan, based in
the capital of Khartoum, is a military dictatorship, having assumed power in
a coup d'6tat in 1983. 54
The impetus for the attacks by the SLM/A and JEM is the
marginalization and oppression by the central government of local tribal
organizations in Darfur. 5 The tribal structure in Darfur has been the
primary mechanism for land distribution and local governing decisions for
many years. However, the Sudanese government decided to abolish the
tribal structure and install appointed administrators to centralize the
political organization of Darfur.5 6 In or around 2002, the SLM/A and JEM
began to organize attacks against the government positions, causing
government police to retreat to the urban centers of Darfur and leaving the
rural areas largely in SLM/A and JEM control.5 7 In response to these
50 See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5040th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040 (Sept. 18 2004).
51 See

id.; see also Darfur Report, supra note 3, at 1 (issuing the Report pursuant to
Resolution 1564).
Darfur Report, supranote 3,
53 Id. 62.
14 Id. 46.
51 Id. 60.
52

56 Id. 57.
" Id. 66.

77-137.
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assaults, the government of Sudan began to organize forces against the rebel
militias.58
The Sudanese government has a regular military structure that is
engaged in a protracted fight in southern Sudan for control of this oil-rich
area.5 9 The government forces in southern Sudan are insufficient in
number, however, and are supplemented by militias. In particular, the
government employs Popular Defense Forces (PDF), consisting of civilian
volunteers, to aid and serve under the command of the regular armed forces
of Sudan. The PDF are paid, equipped, and trained by the Sudanese
government and take orders from within the military structure, although the
members of the PDF are considered civilians.6 ° Victims of atrocities use
the term Janjaweed-translated variously as "a man with a gun on a horse"
or "devil on horseback"--to describe militias6 such as the PDF or affiliated
militias that serve the Sudanese government. 1
The Darfur Commission focused considerable attention on the precise
relationship between the Janjaweed and the Sudanese government.6 2 The
government gave the Darfur Commission conflicting reports about its
relationship with the Janjaweed, frequently asserting that the Janjaweed are
merely an independent group of bandits acting without any relationship to
the government.63 This, however, was contradicted by evidence showing
that the government has been providing arms and funding to the Janjaweed,64
and, in some cases, even ordered the Janjaweed to attack civilians.
Victims and witnesses testified to the Darfur Commission that the
Janjaweed acted in concert with and through the support of regular
65
government armed forces, including receiving air support from them.
58 Id.

68.
9 Id. 1 45, 50.
60 Id. 1181-84.
61 Id. 1 98-105.
62 Id. 1 106.
63 Id. 98 ("Victims of attacks have indicated that the Janjaweed are acting with and on
behalf of Government forces. In contrast, senior Sudanese State authorities, in Khartoum
and in the three Darfur States, indicated to the Commission that any violations committed by
the Janjaweed have no relationship to State actors.").
64 In many cases a ground attack began with soldiers appearing in Land Cruisers and other

vehicles, followed by a large group of Janjaweed on horses and camels, all with weapons such as
AK47s, G3s and rocket-propelled grenades. Many of the attacks involved the killing of
civilians, including women and children, the burning of houses, schools and other civilian
structures, as well as the destruction of wells, hospitals and shops. Looting and theft of civilian
property, in particular livestock, invariably followed the attacks and in many instances every
single item of moveable property was either stolen or destroyed by the attackers. Often the
civilians were forcibly displaced as a result of the attack.

Id. 242.
65

Id. 280-83.
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In drafting its report, the Darfur Commission also analyzed a variety of
international laws that are binding on the Sudanese government, as well as
laws potentially applicable to the rebel groups.66 The primary violations
found by the Darfur Commission involved breaches of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law, including war crimes.67
Although it has not ratified the Rome Statute, Sudan is a signatory of the
Rome Statute, and thereby is required to refrain from "acts which would
defeat the object and purpose" of the Rome Statute.68 This means that
Sudan is bound to refrain from violations of human rights and humanitarian
law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.69 Sudan is
also bound to numerous international treaties regarding human rights and
humanitarian law. 70 By committing human rights violations within its
territory, Sudan is failing to comply with its obligations under these
treaties. 7 1 The Darfur Commission also found that the parties involved in

66

Id. 142.

67 See infra note 74 (describing examples of these human rights violations, which include
war crimes).
68 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions
331,
available
/I_1_1969.pdf.
69 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-8. Genocide includes acts committed "with intent
to destroy ...a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Id. art. 6. Crimes against
humanity are acts committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population." Id. art. 7(1). War crimes are large scale acts which constitute
"grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions... and other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict." Id. art. 8(2)(a)-(b).
70 See Darfur Report, supra note 3,
147.
The Sudan is bound by a number of international treaties on human rights. These include the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) .... With regard to international humanitarian law, the Sudan is bound by the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, of 18
September 1997, whereas it is not bound by the two Additional Protocols of 1977, at least qua
treaties ... the Sudan has signed, but not yet ratified, the Statute of the International Criminal
Court and the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict, and is therefore bound to refrain from "acts which would defeat
the object and purpose" of that Statute and the Optional Protocol.
Id.

147-54.
71 [The crimes found by the Commission including] murder contravene[] the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the African Charter on Human and
People's rights, which protect the right to life and to not be "arbitrarily deprived of his life." As
for international humanitarian law, murder of civilians who do not take active part in hostilities
in an internal armed conflict, is prohibited both by common Article 3 of the 1949 Genevan
Conventions and by the corresponding rule of customary international law, as codified in Article
4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II. It is also criminalized either as a war crime or, depending upon
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the conflict in Darfur are bound by the customary rules of internal conflict.
In particular, the parties must obey the rules regarding the distinctions
between civilians and armed participants.7 2
The Darfur Commission was charged not only with identifying the
violations of international law that occurred in Darfur, but also with
identifying the perpetrators of the violations. 73 Among its findings
regarding the crimes committed, the Commission determined there was
evidence of the most serious violations of human rights and humanitarian
law by the Janjaweed militia. The crimes included killing of civilians,
massacres, rape, looting, and many other crimes against humanity and war
crimes, conducted indiscriminately against villages and resulting in large
numbers of deaths and displacement of civilians.74 The Darfur Commission
found that vast numbers of these violations were committed by the
government and its surrogate fighters (i.e., the Janjaweed) as part of its
counter-insurgency tactics against the SLM/A and JEM in 2003."5 The
evidence found in the Commission's report provided the U.N. Security
Council with ample justification for further action.

the circumstances, as a crime against humanity, as proved by case law and by the Statutes of the
various international tribunals [such as the ICTY and ICTR].

Id. 291.
72 See id. T 141-71 (providing a comprehensive list of the rules of conflict that apply
to
the Darfur combatants).
71 Id. at

4.

74 It is apparent from the Commission's factual findings that in many instances Government
forces and militias under their control attacked civilians and destroyed and burned down villages
in Darfur contrary to the relevant principles and rules of international humanitarian law. Even
assuming that in all the villages they attacked there were rebels present or at least some rebels
were hiding there, or that there were persons supporting rebels-an assertion that finds little
support from the material and information collected by the Commission-the attackers did not
take the necessary precautions to enable civilians to leave the villages or to otherwise be shielded
from attack. The impact of the attacks shows that the military force used was manifestly
disproportionate to any threat posed by the rebels. In fact, attacks were most often intentionally
directed against civilians and civilian objects. Moreover, the manner in which many attacks
were conducted (at dawn, preceded by the sudden hovering of helicopter gun ships and often
bombing) demonstrates that such attacks were also intended to spread terror among civilians so
as to compel them to flee the villages. In a majority of these cases, victims of the attacks
belonged to African tribes, in particular the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa tribes. From the
viewpoint of international law these violations of international humanitarian law no doubt
constitute large-scale war crimes.
Id. 267.
75 Id.
185 ("A common conclusion is that, in its response to the insurgency, the

Government has committed acts against the civilian population, directly or through surrogate
armed groups, which amount to gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law.").
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B. SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL

In response to the Darfur Commission's report, the U.N. Security
Council, in March of 2005, passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593
referring the Darfur case to the ICC Prosecutor's Office.7 6 U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1593 represented the first time that the Council referred

a case to the ICC, and the first time that the Court attempted to extend its
jurisdiction to the territory of a State that was not a party to the Rome
Statute.77

U.N. Security Resolution 1593 also required the Prosecutor's

Office to give an initial update to the U.N. Security Council within the first
three months of referral and every six months following the initial update.7
Sudan has exhibited mixed reactions to the involvement of the ICC in
Darfur, ranging from limited cooperation to outright opposition.7 9 U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1593 required the full cooperation of Sudan

and any other States actively involved in the conflict. It also urged nonState Parties and regional organizations like the AU to cooperate fully in

the Prosecutor's Office's investigation of the crimes. 80

76

S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 6,

1.

77 The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:... (b) A situation in which one or more of such
crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
78 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 6,
8 (referring to the responsibility of the Prosecutor to
give updates to the Security Council).
79 Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to
UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 10, delivered to the Security Council (Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPReportJNSC4-DarfurEnglish.pdf
[hereinafter Fourth Report to the U.N. Security Council]. This Report states:
An OTP mission to the Sudan took place in August 2006, during which formal witness
interviews were conducted with two senior Government officials who, by virtue of their
positions were able to provide information in relation to the conflict in Darfur and the activities
of Government forces and other groups.... The government of the Sudan has also provided a
limited amount of the documentation requested by the Office.
Id. at 9-10. After the issuance of the two arrest warrants for suspects in the Darfur crimes in
the Spring of 2007, however, Sudan has shown an increasing unwillingness to cooperate
with the ICC. Id.; see infra note 91.
80 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 6,
1-2 (requiring the cooperation of Sudan and other
states involved in the Darfur conflict and urging all non-State Parties and regional
organizations like the AU, which has a mission in Sudan, to cooperate fully with the ICC);
3 ("Security Council invites the Court and the African Union to discuss
see also id.
practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court,
including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to
regional efforts in the fight against impunity.").
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IV. ICC PROGRESS ON DARFUR

A. INVESTIGATION
Following the U.N. Security Council referral, the ICC Prosecutor, Mr.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, notified the Presidency of the ICC of the entry of the
case in the Court's docket. 8' The Presidency assigned the case to Pre-Trial
Chamber I for all pre-trial judicial decisions.
As part of its preliminary
analysis of the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor's Office received the Darfur
Report and the evidence gathered as part of that inquiry. Included in the
Darfur Commission's documents was a sealed envelope containing the
names of fifty-one people that the Commission determined were most
responsible for the crimes committed in Darfur.83 The Prosecutor opened
the document containing the suspects' names with witnesses present and
then resealed it to keep the findings confidential.84 The Prosecutor's
preliminary analysis consisted of a determination, pursuant to the Rome
Statute, that the alleged crimes were admissible before the ICC.85 In June
2005, the Prosecutor decided that sufficient evidence existed to initiate a
81

See Regulations of the Court, § 2, Reg. 45, ICC-BD/O1-01-04 (2004). The ICC has

had one President to date, Mr. Phillipe Kirsch, who was re-elected in 2006. See Press
Release, ICC, Election of the Presidency (March 11, 2006), availableat
http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/131 html.
82 See Regulations of the Court, supra note 81.
83 See Press Release, ICC, List of Names of Suspects Opened by the ICC OTP (Apr. 11,
2005), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=101&l=en.html.
84 Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to
UNSC 1593 (2005), at 3, delivered to the Security Council (Dec. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMOUNSC-ReportB-En.pdf [hereinafter Second
Report to the U.N. Security Council].
85 Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to UNSCR
1593 (2005), at 1, 3, delivered to the Security Council (June 29, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICCDarfur_UNSCReport-29-06 05_EN.pdf
[hereinafter FirstReport to the U.N.Security Council].
Prior to the commencement of a formal investigation, the Prosecutor is required to gather and
assess relevant information in order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an
investigation [in accordance with article 53 of the Statute] ....Having carried out this

preliminary analysis, on 1 June 2005 the Prosecutor determined that there is a reasonable basis to
initiate an investigation into the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002.

Id. at 1; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(a)-(c) (listing factors, including
whether a case is admissible under Article 17's complementarity principle, that a Prosecutor
must consider in determining whether to proceed with an investigation of a case referred by
U.N. Security Council). In addition to considering admissibility under the complementarity
principle, the Prosecutor, before initiating an investigation into alleged crimes, must
determine whether the proceeding is in the interest of justice and whether there is "a
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the court has been or is
being committed." Id.
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full investigation. 86 Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor's Office is
responsible for conducting an independent and full investigation of all
87
crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.
The Prosecutor's Darfur investigation presents unique challenges
because it is the first time an investigation has taken place in the midst of an
ongoing conflict.88 In addition, because the investigation involves Sudan, a
non-State Party, the Prosecutor must rely on Article 87 of the Rome Statute,
which provides that specific ad hoc agreements for cooperation shall be
reached in the case where a non-State Party is involved in an
investigation. 89 As required under the relevant U.N. Security Council
resolution, the Prosecutor has commented frequently on the varying levels

Evidence is sufficient to initiate an investigation, and findings of admissibility indicate
the ICC would have jurisdiction over crimes alleged in Darfur. FirstReport to the U.N.
Security Council,supra note 85, at 2-4; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(a)-(c)
(discussing factors the Prosecutor must consider before deciding to proceed with an
investigation of a referred case).
87 "The Prosecutor shall[,] in order to establish the truth, extend the investigation
to
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal
responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating
circumstances equally." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 54. "The Prosecutor shall analyse
the seriousness of the information received." Id. art. 15(2). Note that under Article 54, the
Prosecutor may, as part of his or her investigation, "[s]eek the cooperation of any State or
intergovernmental organization or arrangement in accordance with its respective competence
and/or mandate." Id. art. 54(3)(c). If a State Party is unable to cooperate, due to
unavailability of its authorities, etc., the Pre-Trial Chamber may still authorize the
Prosecutor to carry out investigatory actions in the territory of a State Party. Id. art. 57(3)(d).
88Due to attacks by the Janjaweed against humanitarian workers, many interviews of
victims and witnesses took place outside of Darfur to ensure the safety of investigators and
those giving testimony. Second Report to the U.N. Security Council,supra note 84, at 2-5.
89Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 87(5)(a) ("The Court may invite any State not party to
this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an
agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis."). If a non-State Party fails to
comply with such an agreement, the Court may inform the U.N. Security Council if it
originally referred the case:
Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoe arrangement or an
agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or
agreement, the Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security
Council referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council.
Id. art. 87(5)(b). Also, in the case of Darfur, the U.N. Security Council resolution referring
the case required that Sudan cooperate with the Prosecutor in his investigation of the matter.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Acting under its Chapter VII powers, the U.N.
Security Council is charged with maintaining peace and security around the world, and is
given the power to compel cooperation with its efforts to do so. U.N. Charter ch. VII. The
Rome Statute gives the Court as much expanded jurisdiction over non-State Parties as the
U.N. Security Council determines is necessary through its own referral. Rome Statute, supra
note 1, art. 13.
86
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of cooperation of the Sudanese government and other organizations.9" Most
recently, Sudan has indicated its unwillingness to continue cooperating with
the Court. 9'
B. PROSECUTOR'S APPLICATION

The Prosecutor's initial investigation took approximately twenty
months to complete, focusing primarily on the crimes which constituted the
gravest offenses. At the conclusion of this investigation, the Prosecutor, on
February 27, 2007, submitted the first Application for Summonses, or
warrants, for two suspects involved in the Darfur crimes. 92 The Application
included the various counts of crimes charged against the two suspects and
the evidence supporting the charges. 93 The two suspects named in the
Application were Ahmad Harum and Ali Kushayb.94
Harun was the
90

"The Government of the Sudan has also provided a limited amount of the

documentation requested by the Office [of the Prosecutor]." Fourth Report to the U.N.
Security Council, supra note 79, at 11. The Prosecutor's obligation to report to the U.N.
Security Council stems from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 referring the case to the
ICC. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
91"[A] member of the parliament from the SPLM... Ahmad Isa criticized [in] a
telephone call to Al-Ayyam[, a Sudanese news agency,] the proposals made by members of
the [ruling] National Congress (NC) to persuade crime witnesses in Darfur not to collaborate
with the ICC." Al-Ayam, Sudan: SPLM ParliamentariansCall on Government to Hand
over Darfur Suspects, BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS (May 7, 2007). "'Our

position is very, very clear-the ICC cannot assume any jurisdiction to judge any Sudanese
outside the country,' Justice Minister Mohamed Ali al-Mardi told the Associated
Press... Asked whether Sudan would continue its past sporadic cooperation with the
[C]ourt, al-Mardi answered, 'What cooperation? It's over."' Mike Corder, International
Court Issues Arrest Warrantsfor Darfur War Crimes Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 2,
2007), accessed via Access World News database.
92 Prosecutor's Application under Article 58(7), ICC-02/05-56 (Feb. 27, 2007), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-56 English.pdf. [hereinafter Prosecutor's
Application]. Technically, under the Rome Statute, a request for summonses is distinct from
a request for warrants:
As an alternative to seeking a warrant of arrest, the Prosecutor may submit an application
requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for the person to appear. If the Pre-Trial
Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the
crime alleged and that a summons is sufficient to ensure the person's appearance, it shall issue
the summons, with or without conditions restricting liberty (other than detention) if provided for
by national law, for the person to appear.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(7).
93 See generally Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92 (listing the details of the crimes
alleged); see also infra notes 94-97 (providing examples of crimes alleged).
94 Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92, at 4.
[The Prosecutor] has concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ahmad
Muhammad Harun (hereinafter also referred to as "Ahmad Harun" or "Harun") and Ali
Muhammad Ali Abd-AI-Rahman (also known as Ali Kushayb and hereinafter referred to as "Ali
Kushayb" or "Kushayb") bear criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity and war
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Minister of the Interior and head of the Darfur Security Desk for the
government in 2003, when the majority of the crimes under investigation by
the Prosecutor's Office occurred. 95 Kushayb, the leader of the Janjaweed
militia in West Darfur, commanded thousands of personnel. 96 Of the fifty-

one suspects transmitted to the Prosecutor, Harun and Kushayb are believed
97
to bear the greatest responsibility for the criminal acts occurring in Darfur.
Indeed, the findings made by the Prosecutor as a result of his

investigation into the Darfur case revealed profound responsibility for the
crimes in Darfur by the two named suspects. The Application contained a
total of fifty-one counts of various crimes against humanity and war crimes,
as defined by the Rome Statute: forty-one counts against both suspects; nine
against Kushayb alone; and one against Harun alone.98 The evidence
crimes committed in Darfur in 2003 and 2004. The Prosecutor therefore requests under Article
58 of the Rome Statute that Pre-Trial Chamber I issue summonses naming Ahmad Muhammad
Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-AI-Rahman (also known as Ali Kushayb) and directing them
to appear in this Court for initial proceedings under Article 60 [requiring suspects to be informed
of the charges and allowing requests for interim release pending trial].
9' Id.
96 Id.

29-31.

36-37.

97 [The Prosecutor's] Application alleges that Ahmad Harun-with his primary responsibility
for recruiting Militia/Janjaweed in Darfur-and Ali Kushayb-a well known Militia/Janjaweed
leader who participated in attacking civilian towns and villages-joined each other, and others,
in pursuing the shared and illegal objective of persecuting and attacking civilian populations in
Darfur.

Id. at 5-6. The following two counts against both Harun and Kushayb from the Prosecutor's
Application are included for illustrative purposes:
COUNT I (Persecution in the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas constituting a Crime
against Humanity)... From on or about 15 August 2003 to on or about 31 August 2003, Ahmad
Harun and Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose,
contributed to the commission of a crime against humanity which in fact occurred, namely the
persecution of the primarily Fur population of the Kodoom villages and surrounding areas in the
Bundis Administrative Unit of Wadi Salih Locality in West Darfur, by acts of murder, attacking
the civilian population, destruction of property and forcible transfer in violation of Articles
7(l)(h) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute... COUNT 14 (Rape in Bindisi town and surrounding
areas constituting a War Crime)... On or about 15 August 2003, Ahmad Harun and Ali
Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the
commission of a war crime which in fact occurred, namely the rape of women and girls from the
primarily Fur population of Bindisi town and surrounding areas in the Bundis Administrative
Unit ofWadi Salih Locality in West Darfur, including [NAMES OF VICTIMS REDACTED], in
violation of Articles 8(2)(e)(vi) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

Id. at 6, 10-11. The rest of the fifty-one counts are listed sequentially. Id. at 6-23.
98 Genocide was not included among the charges against Harun and Kushayb. While the
absence of genocide charges was not addressed in the Prosecutor's Application, it was
addressed in the Darfur Report:
[T]he commission concludes that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of
genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of
human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control. These two
elements are: first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm,
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presented in the Application reflects an established practice of attack,
murder, looting, and rape of civilians in Darfur by the Janjaweed, which
Kushayb led with the support, complacency, and aid of government forces
and representatives such as Harun. 99 The crimes committed by the two
named suspects were part of the counterinsurgency program conducted by
the government in response to the increased attacks by the SLM/A and JEM
in 2003.00
C. THE PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER ISSUES ARREST WARRANTS FOR HARUN
AND KUSHAYB

After the submission of an application by the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial
Chamber must determine whether arrest warrants or summonses may issue
to ensure the appearance of suspects before the Court. 10 1 On April 27,
2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued such warrants for the arrest of Harun

or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, second,
on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected group being targeted by the
authors of criminal conduct .... [O]ne crucial element appears to be missing, at least as far as
the central Government authorities are concerned: genocidal intent. Generally speaking the
policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a
specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national
or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on
villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of
counter-insurgency warfare.

Darfur Report, supra note 3, 513-22.
99 After his appointment to the Darfur Security Desk, Ahmad Harun monitored the
efforts to recruit:
Militia/Janjaweed in Darfur, and authorized the provision of funds and arms to those Militia, as a
means of ensuring their effectiveness. At all times relevant to this application, Ali Kushayb was
a tribal leader who, funded and encouraged by Harun, subsequently led Militia/Janjaweed in
attacking the civilian populations of towns and villages in West Darfur ....
Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92, 29.
100 Detailed evidence of this counterinsurgency

campaign

was presented in the

Prosecutor's Application. Id.
38-111.
101 At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the
application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the
application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) The arrest of the person appears necessary: (i) To ensure the

person's appearance at trial, (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the
investigation or the court proceedings, or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from
continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction
of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(1). The Pre-Trial Chamber, upon the request of the
Prosecutor, may also issue summonses for the appearance of suspects before the Court. See
id. art. 58(7). For the relevant textual provision related to these summonses, see supra note
92. Summonses must be served on the person. See supra note 92.
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and Kushayb. 10 2 The Rome Statute provides that it is the responsibility of
the State having custody over suspects to ensure their safe transfer to the
Court's custody. 10 3 In his fifth address to the U.N. Security Council, the
Prosecutor explained that, in order to ensure compliance with the arrest
warrants, the U.N. Security
Council may be required to pressure the
10 4
government of Sudan.

102

The Pre-Trial Chamber "[d]ecide[d] to issue warrants of arrest for Ahmad Harun and

Ali Kushayb for their alleged responsibility for crimes against humanity and/or war crimes
under article 25 of the Statute .... " Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article
58(7) of the Statute, at 43, ICC-02/05-01/07 (April 27, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-07-07_English.pdf [hereinafter PTC Warrant Decision].
Apparently, the Pre-Trial Chamber believed issuing summonses for the two suspects would
not have ensured their appearance before the Court.
103 1. The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with
the material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which
that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and
surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part
and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender. 2.
Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a national court on the basis of
the principle of neb is in idem [double jeopardy] as provided in article 20, the requested State
shall immediately consult with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on
admissibility. If the case is admissible, the requested State shall proceed with the execution of
the request. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may postpone the execution
of the request for surrender of the person until the Court makes a determination on admissibility.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(1)-(2). For the text of this double jeopardy provision, see
supra note 44. Neither Harun nor Kushayb has yet to bring such a challenge. Though
charges are currently pending against Kushayb in the Sudanese national courts, they
apparently are for different crimes than those charged in the Prosecutor's Application. See
infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. Under the Rome Statute, because of the pending
charges against Kushayb, Sudan, after complying with the warrant request, should consult
with the Court: "If the person sought is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in
the requested State for a crime different from that for which surrender to the Court is sought,
the requested State, after making its decision to grant the request, shall consult with the
Court." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(4). Sudan must grant the request to execute the
warrants because the Prosecutor has already determined the case is admissible before the
Court. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104 The objective is now to ensure the appearance of these individuals in Court. This
major "challenge requires the unconditional cooperation of all. The Security Council and
regional organizations must take the lead in calling on the Sudan as the territorial State to
arrest the two individuals and ensure their appearance in Court." Fifth Report of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 2,
delivered to the Security Council (June 7, 2007), availableat http://www.icccpi.int/library/
organs/otp/OTP.ReportUNSC5-Darfur_.English.pdf [hereinafter Fifth Report to the U.N.
Security Council]. Sudan has already indicated its reluctance to comply with the warrants.
See supra note 91 (providing statement of Sudanese Justice Minister indicating
unwillingness to comply).
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Currently, the Prosecutor is awaiting the arrest and transfer of the
suspects so that he may proceed with the trial phase.10 5 The Pre-Trial
Chamber's decision to issue warrants requires that the Registry of the Court
transmit warrants for the two suspects to Sudan and all other States with
which cooperation has been requested. 10 6 Since 2006, Harun has been
serving as the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in the Sudanese
government. 10 7 Kushayb is reportedly being detained in Sudan by
government officials on different charges, although there is some suspicion
that he may have recently been released. 10 8 Though unlikely, if Sudan were
to issue additional charges against either of the named suspects, it would be
for the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine under the
and willing
complementarity principle whether the national courts are able
09
to prosecute Harun and Kushayb genuinely and impartially.
105 "The

next step should be the arrest and surrender of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb,

and thereafter, the proceedings relating to confirmation of charges." Fifth Report to the U.N.
Security Council, supra note 104, at 5. The procedures for arrest of a suspect are contained
in Article 59. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(1) ("A State Party which has received a
request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest
the person in question in accordance with its laws .... "). All State Parties have received a
request for execution of the arrest warrants. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
Sudan is obligated to cooperate with the warrant request under U.N. Security Council
2. This Resolution also urges the
Resolution 1593. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 6,
cooperation of non-State Parties in the Darfur case. See supra note 80 and accompanying
text. The procedures regarding the surrender of a person in the custodial State are contained
in Article 89 of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 89; see also supra note
103 (explaining surrender procedures). "Once ordered to be surrendered by the custodial
State, the person shall be delivered to the Court as soon as possible." Rome Statute, supra
note 1, art. 59(7).
106The Registry:

shall transmit such requests to the competent Sudanese authorities in accordance with rule 176(2)
of the Rules and to the following States: (i) All States Parties to the Statute; (ii) All United
Nations Security Council members that are not States Parties to the Statute; and (iii) Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya [the non-State Parties bordering Sudan].
PTC Warrant Decision, supra note 102, at 56-57. For a discussion on the obligations of
these States to execute the warrant requests, see supra notes 80, 103.
107Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council,supra note 104, at 4.
108 While there are indications that Ali Kushayb is under investigation in the Sudan in relation to
certain matters, the investigation does not relate to the same incidents as those investigated by
the Office of the Prosecutor. Concerning Ahmad Harun, there is no indication that he is or has
been subject to any criminal investigation.
Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council, supra note 104, at 8. See infra note 124
concerning Kushayb's apparent release from custody.
109 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15(4), 53(2). Under article 53(3)(a), the U.N.
Security Council, as the referring body, may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to review a
decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed due to inadmissibility under Article 17 (which
includes the complementarity principle). Id. art. 53(3)(a). After its review, the Pre-Trial
Chamber may request the Prosecutor to re-consider the decision not to proceed. Note that
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V. EMERGING ISSUES IN THE DARFUR CASE

A. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE SUDANESE SPECIAL COURTS

As part of the complementarity regime created by the Rome Statute,
the ICC is a court of last resort, only to be used when a national jurisdiction
is unavailable, unable, or unwilling to prosecute for crimes in the Court's
jurisdiction.!10 Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that the Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC may determine a case is admissible before the ICC
under the complementarity principle if national proceedings were initiated
for the "purposes of shielding the person from criminal responsibility" or
were not conducted independently or impartially.' 1 1 Furthermore, in the
ICC case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Court decided that in order
for a case to be inadmissible before the ICC under the complementarity
principle as a result of concurrent national court proceedings, these
person and the conduct which is the
proceedings must "encompass both the
' 12
Court."
the
before
case
the
subject of
As early as 2004, Sudan and its judiciary began to take action in
response to the crimes committed within its jurisdiction. In particular, the
President of Sudan established a concurrent National Commission of
Inquiry (NCOI) to investigate the Darfur crimes. 1 13 The findings of the
NCOI were somewhat similar to the findings of both the Darfur
Commission and the Prosecutor's own later investigations. The NCOI's
findings addressed reports of genocide, rape as a crime against humanity,
the bombing of civilians as a violation of the Geneva Conventions, forcible
under Article 53(4), "[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to
initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information." Id. art. 53(4).
The determination by the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the admissibility
of a case would be made pursuant to the definitions laid out in Articles 17 and 20 containing,
respectively, the Court's complementarity principle and double jeopardy provision. Id. arts.
17(1)-(2), 20; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
complementarity principle under the Rome Statute. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the double jeopardy provision.
110 See supra note 43 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
complementarity principle under the Rome Statute.
1 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2)(a). Article 17 also provides that proceedings in
a national court must be consistent with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Id. art. 17(2)(b).
112 Fifth Report to the U.N.Security Council, supra note 104, at 7. See also supra notes
45-48 and accompanying text (discussing further the Lubanga case).
"3 Additionally, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was formed to investigate
11. A special
crimes committed in Darfur. Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92,
committee for the crime of rape was also created; however, the Parliamentary Commission
of Inquiry found that this committee was unnecessarily limited from investigating other
forms of sexual abuse which are within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Id. 12.
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The NCOI

concluded that genocide did not occur in Darfur and that rape, though it did
occur, did not constitute a crime against humanity. 15
The NCOI,
acknowledged bombing and killing of civilians by government military
forces and rebel groups, rape, and other crimes involving sexual violence,
although it underemphasized their magnitude and severity.' 16
In addition, the Sudanese government responded to calls for justice in
Darfur by establishing the Special Court for Darfur in June 2005.117 After
completing six low-level prosecutions, the Special Court for Darfur was
replaced by special courts for each of the three Darfur regions: North, West,
and South Darfur. 1 8 As of the late spring of 2007, the special courts had
only completed thirteen cases against low-level suspects in Darfur, none of
whom was charged with crimes of the same gravity or magnitude as the
crimes charged in the Prosecutor's Application against Harun or
Kushayb.11 9
If the Prosecutor determines at any time that the Sudanese special
courts are able and willing to prosecute in an impartial manner the two

114

Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council,supra note 104, at 4.

115id.
116

DarfurReport, supra note 3,

456-62.

To summarise, the Executive Summary of [NCOI] states that serious violations of human
rights were committed in the three Darfur States. All parties to the conflict were involved. What
happened did not constitute genocide. Numbers of persons killed were exaggerated: losses of
life incurred by all parties, including the armed forces and police, did not exceed a few
thousands. Rape and crimes of sexual violence were committed but were not widespread or
systematic to amount to a crime against humanity. [NCOI] recommends judicial investigations
into some specific incidents and a setting up of a judicial committee to investigate property
losses.
The [U.N.] Commission finds that while it is important for [NCOI] to acknowledge some
wrong-doings, its findings and recommendations are insufficient and inappropriate to address the
gravity of the situation. Simply put, they provide too little too late. The massive scale of alleged
crimes committed in Darfur is hardily [sic] captured by the report of the National Commission.
As a result, the report attempts to justify the violations rather than seeking effective measures to
address them.
Id.
461-62.
117 Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92, 256-57.
118 "The trials conducted at that point related to purported low level suspects who were
not likely to figure in any case before the Court." Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92,

256.
119 "The cases [before the Special Courts] involved low-ranking individuals primarily
accused of relatively minor offenses such as theft. None of the crimes charged reflected the
massive scale and gravity of the atrocities in Darfur. No senior commanders or superiors
were charged for their part in the atrocities." Human Rights Watch, Sudan: National Courts
Have Done Nothing on Darfur, at 1, (June 11, 2007), available at http://www.iccnow.org
/documents/HRWSudaneseCourtsDarfur 1ljune07_eng.pdf.

2008]'

ARGUING FOR ANINTEGRA TED APPROACH

1097

named suspects for the charges in the Application, and are in fact doing so,
then, under the complementarity principle, the case would become
inadmissible before the ICC. 120 The Prosecutor has not yet made this
determination and is unlikely to do so in the near future.
Under the complementarity principle, admissibility of a case before the
ICC hinges on several additional considerations. The national proceedings
not only must be charging the same person as the ICC, but also must be
pursuing the same charges against that person involving the same criminal
conduct. 12 1 In the case of Kushayb, the current proceedings against him in
the Sudanese Special Court for Darfur do not pertain to the same crimes as
in the Application by the ICC Prosecutor. For example, the ICC counts
against Kushayb are for "attacks upon [the areas of] Kodoom, Bindisi,
Mukajar, and Arawala."' 122 Meanwhile, the reported arrest of Kushayb in
Sudan, on charges issued by the Special Court, stems from "incidents
concerning the areas of Shattaya in South Darfur and Deleig in West
Darfur."' 123 The assertion of the Prosecutor is that the ICC is pursuing
different charges for different crimes against Kushayb; therefore, the case is
still capable of prosecution before the ICC under the complementarity
principle. Moreover, Sudan has apparently released Kushayb from custody
for the crimes for which it was trying him. This act would appear to further
indicate Sudan's unwillingness to prosecute Kushayb for any crime, and
hence further
support the case's admissibility under the complementarity
124
principle.
The complementarity principle is not violated in the ICC case against
Harun because the Sudanese national courts have shown no willingness to
prosecute this individual. In fact, no concurrent proceedings are in progress
120 It is important to reiterate that the admissibility assessment is not a judgment on the
Sudanese justice system as a whole, but an assessment as to whether or not the Government of
the Sudan has investigated or prosecuted, or is investigating or prosecuting in a genuine manner
the case selected by the Prosecution for presentation to the Court.

Fourth Report to the U.N. Security Council, supra note 79, at 8. For a description of the
process by which such an admissibility decision under the Statute would be made, see supra

note 109 and accompanying text.
121 See Rome Statute, supranote 1, arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3); see also supra notes 43, 109 and

accompanying text (regarding the rules of admissibility).
122 Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council, supranote 104, at 3.
123 Id. at 4, 7; see also Prosecutor's Application, supra note 92,

259 (detailing the

information gathered on the Special Courts).
124 See infra note 127 (discussing substantive limitations in Sudanese law preventing the
application of certain charges by government prosecutors); Sixth Report to the U.N. Security
Council, supra note 3, at 3 ("In relation to Ali Kushayb, against whom the [Sudanese
government] had previously indicated that there were investigations, on 30 September then
Foreign Affairs Minister Lam Akol reportedly stated that he was released for lack of
evidence.").
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at any level within the Sudanese court system. 12
Currently, Harun
maintains a high position in the government of Sudan. 12 6 With the evidence
of Harun's conspiracy with the Janjaweed to commit crimes against
civilians in Darfur, the shared responsibility on the part of the government
for supporting the activities of this militia in their extreme tactics of
counterinsurgency becomes increasingly apparent. In light of this shared
responsibility for the Darfur crimes, any attempt by the national jurisdiction
to prosecute Harun or Kushayb in response to the Prosecutor's Application
and the Pre-Trial Chamber's issuance of the arrest warrants could be seen 1as
27
suspect, and the genuineness of any proceedings called into question.
Numerous human rights groups have questioned the ability of any national
court in Sudan to prosecute crimes which have been committed by officials
of the government.12 8 Therefore, there are no indications that the case
against Harun or Kushayb will be inadmissible before the ICC under the
complementarity principle because of concurrent proceedings in the
national court system in Sudan.
B. PROPOSALS FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE
CRISIS
Though the ICC's ability to successfully prosecute Harun and Kushayb
is important for its overall mission in bringing international criminals to
justice, the magnitude and complexity of the human rights crisis in Darfur
demands a multi-faceted, integrated response. Justice, forgiveness, and
reconciliation in Sudanese society may best be achieved by combining the

125

"Concerning Ahmad Harun, there is no indication that he is or has been subject to any

criminal investigation in relation to Darfur." Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council,
supra note 104, at 8; see also Sixth Report to the U.N. Security Council, supra note 3, at 3
("All public statements concerning Ahmad Harun indicate that he would neither be
surrendered nor subject to national proceedings. The [Sudanese government] has not
conducted nor is conducting any proceedings in relation to the Prosecution's case.").
126 "[Harun] currently serves as Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs." Fifth
Report to the U.N. Security Council,supra note 104, at 4.
127 The U.N. Commission determined that the laws of Sudan do not adequately
criminalize crimes against humanity and war crimes, thus making it difficult to ensure
effective national prosecution under the complementarity principle for the crimes in the
Application. Darfur Report, supra note 3, 451. The Human Rights Watch drew similar
conclusions about the Sudanese justice system, citing a lack of proscription in the
substantive law, failure to prosecute on the basis of command responsibility, and other
problems. HRW Special Court Assessment, supra note 9, at 15-30.
128 See, e.g., Amnesty International USA, Fact Sheet, http://www.amnestyusa.org
/Summer-action-series-2/FACTSHEET/page.do?id= 1102056&n 1=52&n2=20l&n3=208
(last visited Sept. 8, 2008). "Statements made by senior Sudanese government officials at
the time made clear that one goal in establishing the [special courts] was to divest the ICC of
jurisdiction." HRW Special Courts Assessment, supra note 9, at 1.
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efforts of criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, and local institutions.
In addition, by including Sudanese actors and institutions in any proposal to
resolve the crisis, the spirit of complementarity-that notion of a shared
role between the ICC and Sudan-is perhaps best fulfilled.
Since it is impracticable for the ICC to prosecute the full range of
crimes committed by the large number of human rights violators in Darfur,
the Sudanese special courts should be encouraged to take part in the task of
prosecuting at least some of the human rights violators in Darfur. In this
way, more perpetrators will be held accountable for their crimes, and more
victims will have the opportunity to experience first-hand the actual trial
and sentencing of perpetrators, whether as testifying witnesses or as
members of the public during trial proceedings. If individual perpetrators
in Darfur were tried exclusively in The Hague by the ICC, victims and
others would have reduced opportunities to participate in and observe
criminal prosecutions, given travel costs and lack of access to media outlets
broadcasting the proceedings. By increasing opportunities for victims to
experience first-hand the administration and application of justice,
reconciliation in a post-crisis Darfur society will be better promoted and
achieved, and victims and survivors will, in turn, be better able to transition
into their new society.
To improve the performance and efficiency of the special courts in
Darfur, the international community, acting through the U.N., the AU, and
ICC Member States, must commit itself to providing these courts with an
appropriate level of financial and human resources while at the same time
encouraging their impartiality and independence. Post-crisis societies like
Darfur typically experience a shortage of judicial personnel, most often due
to death or flight. Therefore, an attempt should be made to identify
impartial individuals both inside and outside Darfur who are knowledgeable
regarding Sudanese law and who could serve, at least on a temporary basis,
as judges and attorneys for the numerous prosecutions that need to be
carried out. Some of these newly recruited individuals could be assigned to
the three special courts already prosecuting individuals for crimes related to
Darfur. By increasing the number of judges and attorneys serving on the
current special courts, the prosecutorial capacity of these courts will be
enhanced. To further accommodate the large number of individuals who
must be prosecuted, these additional judges and attorneys could be assigned
to newly created special courts.
Given the problems of partiality, resource limitations, and current
restrictions in Sudanese law that make it difficult to prosecute for certain
grave breaches of human rights law, the Sudanese national courts should
focus their efforts on low-level criminals responsible for individual acts of
violence. The ICC, on the other hand, can focus its efforts on prosecuting
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high-level criminals, such as Harun and Kushayb, who allegedly organized
and carried out the full-scale plan to kill and displace the civilians in
Darfur. 129 By limiting the Sudanese special courts to trying only low-level
Darfur suspects, these courts will not generally be prosecuting the high-

level government officials and their proxies who played a significant role in
the orchestration and execution of the human rights abuses. Hence, the
impartiality and independence of the courts will be tested less frequently.
Also, current Sudanese law should be adequate to respond to most of the
criminal conduct engaged in by these low-level offenders, such as theft and

murder. The ICC, on the other hand, is the better forum in which to
prosecute high-level offenders because of its greater independence and
impartiality, as well as its broader range of substantive law that allows the
Prosecutor to charge these types of offenders with the crimes they actually
committed, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Under this bifurcated approach to prosecutions for Darfur crimes,
certain procedural measures should be adopted to ensure both uniformity
and fairness in the application of the law. For instance, since the ICC
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for convicted criminals, Sudan
should also bar the death penalty as a possible punishment for those

convicted of crimes related to the Darfur crisis.

Instead, Sudanese

prosecutors should rely exclusively on prison and other non-capital

sentences. This will ensure that those convicted of crimes related to Darfur

129

Such an approach would be similar to the approach followed in the wake of the

genocide in Rwanda. For example, Article 8(1) of the ICTR Statute allows both Rwandan
national courts and the ICTR concurrent jurisdiction for crimes coming within the latter's
jurisdiction, though the ICTR retains primacy over the jurisdiction of all States, including
Rwanda. ICTR Statute, supra note 11, art. 8(1)-(2). One issue that arose in the case of
Rwanda, where low-level criminals of the genocide have been tried in national courts and
genocidal leaders in ICTR proceedings, is the disparity in punishment for those convicted.
Because Rwanda has the death penalty and the ICTR does not, convicted low-level criminals
in Rwandan courts are subject to this penalty while genocidal leaders convicted before the
ICTR escape the ultimate penalty. Id. art. 23(1) ("The penalty imposed by the Trial
Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment."); see also MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 40-41 (1998) (explaining this disparity of punishment
between criminals tried before the ICTR and those tried before Rwandan national courts).
This same disparity in punishment may result if the ICC continues to exert its jurisdiction
over Darfur suspects, who would be subject to the death penalty in Sudan, but not before the
ICC. See Amnesty Int'l website, Document: "Death Sentences and Executions in 2007,"
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/001/2008/en/b43ale5a-ffeaSldc-b092-bdb020617d3d/act500012008eng.html (noting that in 2007 in Sudan, at least
seven individuals were executed, and at least twenty-three individuals received a death
penalty sentence). The death penalty, of course, is not included among the list of applicable
penalties that the ICC may impose on those convicted of crimes under the Statute. Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 77.
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will receive the same forms of punishment regardless
of whether they are
130
tried before the ICC or Sudanese national courts.
In addition, though high-level Sudanese government officials
responsible for orchestrating the human rights abuses and the military
commanders who carried out these abuses will mostly be tried before the
ICC, the current obstacles in the Sudanese judicial system to trying
individuals for grave human rights violations, such as war crimes and
crimes against humanity, should be removed. This will allow national
prosecutors to try individuals for these crimes if circumstances warrant, and
avoid the possibility that a defendant can avoid trial and conviction on more
serious charges simply because he or she is tried by the national system,
and not the ICC 1 3 1 National prosecutors may need to rely upon these

charges if the ICC becomes unable to prosecute all of the high-level
participants in the abuses as a result of a backlog of cases, inability to
execute warrants, or for some other practical reason. There may be
circumstances where a national prosecutor could try an individual for war
crimes or crimes against humanity who, though not a high-level participant
in the abuses, engaged in conduct falling within the scope of these crimes.
Eliminating this current omission in Sudanese law will also help ensure that
individuals committing these types of serious crimes receive the
punishment of which they are most deserving. In this way, reconciliation
among members of the survivor population will be better achieved.
Moreover, to ensure that the prison sentences for those convicted of
Darfur crimes before the ICC and the Sudanese special courts are served
under similar conditions, a fund should be set up by the international
community to construct suitable prisons in Sudan and to improve those
prisons already existing in Sudan to the point that they are comparable to
prisons in other countries which hold those convicted by the ICC.
In this way, victims and others in the post-crisis society will not
experience the injustice of high-level human rights offenders serving prison
sentences in conditions substantially better than those in Sudanese prisons
holding mostly low-level offenders. Avoiding such disparities in the
130See supra note 129 for further discussion of the need to maintain equivalent criminal

penalties between international tribunals and national courts addressing the same human
rights crisis.
131Such lack of symmetry in substantive criminal law between an international court like
the ICC and a national court system like Sudan may be one of the principal difficulties faced
by regimes based on the concept of complementarity. That is, if the national court system
has certain limitations in its substantive criminal law, the international court may, in a
regime based on complementarity, become responsible for a disproportionate number of
cases. This stems from the fact that in a such a regime, the national court would be "unable"
to fully prosecute individuals. For further discussion of this issue in the Sudanese context,
see supra note 127.
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application of sentences will further contribute to the goal of reconciliation,
and help facilitate victims' transition from the period of human rights
abuses to a relatively more stable and democratic period.
In addition, if prison conditions in Sudan are made comparable to
those of other countries holding individuals convicted of Darfur crimes
before the ICC, it may be possible to transfer some individuals convicted
before the ICC to Sudan. This is desirable because, if these prison
sentences are carried out entirely outside the Sudan, those affected most by
the human rights abuses are deprived of the experience associated with the
oversight and application of punishment to those who committed the worst
atrocities. Fostering both the sense and notion in Sudan that justice is being
served upon those who committed the worst crimes becomes difficult when
the prisoner is potentially thousands of miles away and subject to an
unknown, foreign law. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that Sudan
is a poor country where many citizens would lack access to an international
or even domestic media source providing information concerning the
externally meted-out punishment.
If the ICC and Sudanese national courts combine their efforts, the two
jurisdictions will be able to try more individuals who have taken part in the
atrocities, and in the process, better capture the entire spectrum of criminal
acts that have taken place in Darfur, from the decisions of leaders to
implement an illegal policy of attacking and murdering civilians to the
isolated cases of criminal acts that are adequately covered by local
Sudanese law. This broadened prosecutorial undertaking will, in turn, help
to end the culture of impunity that currently exists in the Sudan and
contribute, at least in part, to the goal of national reconciliation for the
survivor population.
More prosecutions alone, however, may not achieve these goals.
These prosecutions should be accompanied by the establishment of a truth
commission in the Sudan, which can help establish a record of the
atrocities, prevent future human rights abuses, and promote reconciliation
among the survivors. 132 Although Sudan should, of course, have a
132

A recommendation for a truth commission was also made by the U.N. Security

Council in its resolution referring the case to the ICC. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 6, 5
(recommending the establishment of a truth commission in Sudan supported by the AU and
the international community and "emphasiz[ing] the need to promote healing and
reconciliation [in Sudan] and encourag[ing] in this respect the creation of institutions,
involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in
order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore longlasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary"). For a discussion
of the goals of a truth commission, see infra note 170. In the wake of the Rwandan
genocide, Professor Mark Drumbl argued that a truth commission, as a potential reintegrative shaming mechanism, would promote restorative justice and national
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significant role in the construction of such a commission, non-Sudanese
sources should not hesitate to contribute funding. 133 The truth commission
could be sponsored and funded by the U.N. or AU. Other sponsors might
include nations who are members of the ICC or perhaps even NGOs from
these nations. These bodies or nations could provide the financial resources
necessary to ensure the continuing operation of the truth commission as
well as the realization of the commission's recommendations.
Once the resources have been secured, Sudan itself should be given a
significant role in the operation of the commission under certain prescribed
guidelines. For example, the current or any future Sudanese government
should be able to choose the members of the truth commission as long as
these representatives adequately reflect the political, ethnic, religious, and
cultural diversity of Sudan. To ensure that the commission's members
reflect a cross-section of Sudanese society, continued funding for the work
of the truth commission should hinge on the satisfaction of this
requirement. Apart from a requirement that the truth commission publish a
report of its findings related to the human rights abuses in a fixed amount of
time, for instance between twelve and eighteen months from the time it
commences its investigative function, the specific content of that report
should largely be left up to the Sudanese members of the truth commission.
Possible topics or ideas for inclusion into the commission's
investigative agenda and findings might be: (1) the essential facts
surrounding particular human rights violations in Darfur; (2) the names of
the victims of human rights abuses; (3) historical background relevant to the
development of the human rights crisis; (4) the effects particular human
rights violations had on these victims; and (5) specific recommendations to
promote reconciliation and forgiveness among the survivors of the crisis.
For example, the truth commission could recommend providing
financial or other reparations to victims, erecting monuments naming the
victims of human rights violations, building public parks in the victims'

reconciliation by (1) pursuing accountability at the social and organizational levels; (2)
forcing genocidal participants to acknowledge the suffering they caused; (3) creating ideas

for preventing war crimes in the future; (4) establishing an historical narrative of what
happened; and (5) providing for a mutuality of shaming. See Mark Drumbl, Punishment,
Postgenocide From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1267-76

(2000).
133 For example, Rwanda had a role in the creation of a truth commission established
prior to the genocide in 1994. Referred to as the International Commission of Investigation
on Human Rights Violations (ICIHRV) in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990, the ICIHRV was
the result of a politically negotiated settlement between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic tribes.
Upon the request of Rwandan NGOs, the ICIHRV was actually sponsored by foreign NGOs
from the United States, Canada, France, and Burkina Faso. See Priscilla B. Hayner, FIFTEEN
TRUTH COMMISSIONS-

1974 TO 1994: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 604, 630 (1994).
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memory, and organizing campaigns and cultural acts to create a climate of
national reconciliation and restore the dignity of victims. 134
Other
possibilities for the commission's recommendations may include: (1) the
creation of special programs to address the physical and mental health
problems of victims of the human rights violations; (2) the establishment of
educational programs in schools and elsewhere that promote understanding,
reconciliation, and forgiveness among survivors; (3) the creation of a
foundation or other similar entity to search for disappeared victims; (4) the
promulgation of laws making it a crime to conceal information relating to
the location of victims and victims' remains; and (5) the removal of
obstacles for victims and their families in gaining 13access to governmental
benefits and documents, including death certificates. 1
A future Sudanese truth commission should play a substantial part in
ensuring compliance with and respect for basic human rights norms. To
this end, the truth commission could put forth specific suggestions to help
ensure the future observance of human rights in Sudan. These suggestions
should address the harmonization of Sudanese law with established
international human rights principles as well as the promotion of an
independent Sudanese judiciary capable of guaranteeing these rights. In
addition, the truth commission should focus on ways to foster respect for
human rights among the military and police as well as address needed
changes in Sudanese constitutional and 136
criminal procedural law so as to
ensure further protection for these rights.
One other important power that should be bestowed upon a future truth
commission in Sudan is the ability to identify perpetrators by name
whenever its investigatory work establishes a clear link between a particular
human rights violation and an individual or group of individuals. This
ability will widen the possibility for reconciliation in the post-crisis society
by providing victims with a real opportunity to both know and forgive their
perpetrators. To assist the truth commission in identifying perpetrators, an
incentive should be provided for these individuals to come forward on their
own and testify before the commission as to their role in the human rights
crisis. This could take the form of a promise from the truth commission
that any testimony provided by perpetrators that significantly assists the
commission in completing its work (e.g., describes the manner in which
particular abuses were carried out, the location of victims' remains, the
134

Some of these topics and recommendations were addressed in the Chilean Truth and

Reconciliation Commission Report, known as the Rettig Report. See
RECONCILIATION REPORT, pt. II, at 6 [hereinafter CHILEAN REPORT].

CHILEAN TRUTH AND

135 Some of these recommendations were also part of the Chilean Report. Id. pt. II, at 6-

9.

136 Id. pt. III, at 9-10.
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identity of co-perpetrators, or includes an apology to specific victims), will
be looked upon favorably if the perpetrator is later convicted following
criminal prosecution. The truth commission could work with government
prosecutors to secure an agreement that would, for example, assure more
favorable sentencing terms for the particular class of perpetrators who
testify before the commission, provide useful information, and are later
convicted in a criminal trial for their abuses.
Individual perpetrators, once identified, could be asked to make a
public apology to victims before the commission followed by a payment to
compensate victims for the harm they inflicted. To the extent that
individual perpetrators are unable or unwilling to provide adequate
compensation, reparation payments to victims should be made by the
government or by the truth commission from a fund set up for these
purposes.
While the creation of such a truth commission in Sudan will provide a
forum for victims to express their grief and begin the lengthy process
towards forgiveness and reconciliation, its impact may be enhanced by
incorporating and operating in conjunction with local, customary
mechanisms for dispute resolution. For example, local mechanisms for
achieving justice in the Sudan, which include Diya ceremonies, peace
meetings, and "judiyya," a mediation process, should also be utilized for
their capacities to promote reconciliation and forgiveness. 37 Since Diya
ceremonies rely upon certain forms of compensation for victims (for
137In southern Sudan, the principle of compensation, known as "Diya", is central to resolving
conflict. There is a notion in traditional justice mechanisms that, for instance, cattle can be given
for a life. Diya ceremonies could serve as the equivalent of "gacaca" courts, where
compensation has an important role, sometimes taking the form of community service.
Katy Glassborow, Dr. Jan Coebergh & Ayesha Kajee, A Question of Justice,
http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EKOI-73236S?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 8,

2008). For a discussion of gacaca courts in Rwanda, see infra note 138. Also, "peace
meetings" may help contribute to reconciliation among the Darfur survivors:
[L]ocal-level peace meetings [emphasize] indigenous traditions of arbitration, reconciliation,
forgiveness and resolution. The report points out that the sacrifice of a white bull (a feature of
Nuer and Dinka religious practice) at [one] meeting set the tone for the ritual component of
peace meetings in the... area.

Id. (citing

MARK BRADBURY ET AL., LOCAL PEACE PROCESSES IN SUDAN: A BASELINE STUDY

13, 46 (2006)).

This study also explains a local form of mediation known as "judiyya,"

which has been customarily used in Sudan to resolve disputes. Bradbury, supra, at 88.
Mediators, known as "ajaweed," are community elders with knowledge of local customs and
laws. The ajaweed are not neutral but rather apply pressure on resisting parties until these
parties agree to the terms stipulated by the ajaweed. Mediations begin with a prayer
(sometimes the mediator is also a religious figure) followed by each party to the dispute
presenting their complaints and demands both verbally and in writing. The ajaweed then
meet privately to reach their decision, and upon returning, attempt to convince each side to
agree to their solution. Id. at 88-89.
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example, perpetrators provide victims with cattle as a way of seeking
forgiveness or perform certain types of community service activities that
positively impact victims and their families), a truth commission
established in Sudan should make efforts to incorporate practices of this
type into its own proceedings and recommendations. Also, to the extent
that in the post-crisis Sudanese society community elders are able and
willing to conduct the mediation proceedings, a truth commission should
consider requiring victims and perpetrators to participate in this form of
dispute resolution. By relying on this more traditional forum to resolve
particular disputes between victims and perpetrators, the truth commission
may be able to complete its work more efficiently while also dispelling any
suggestion that it has failed to take into account local Sudanese structures
and practices for achieving justice and reconciliation. Such an integrated
approach, which relies upon prosecutions, inquiries by a truth commission,
and local mechanisms for resolving disputes,
may be the most effective
' 38
response to the human rights crisis in Darfur.
With proper financial assistance and encouragement from the
international community, including the AU, the formation of a truth
commission in Sudan would appear to be a realistic step for that country to
take in its efforts to promote reconciliation and justice in a post-conflict
society. In fact, the work of a truth commission can be devoted principally
to creating a factual record of the past and making specific
recommendations so that the more troubling aspects of that past can be
138

See Drumbl, supra note 132, at 1221. Drumbl argues for such a blended response in

Rwanda. Specifically, he explains that in Rwanda:
a truth commission could operate in tandem with prosecutions on two fronts: First ... criminal
prosecutions could be brought against those who fail to participate in the truth commission and
against whom evidence of involvement in the genocide is available. This could ensure some
form of accountability for those who are simply beyond shaming. It could also create an
incentive to disclose fully one's wrongdoing to the truth commission. Second, criminal
prosecutions could be initiated against the leaders, coordinators, instigators, and planners of the
genocide.

Id. at 1267-76. Drumbl continues: "True justice after a period of sustained political violence
best may emerge from policy responses that blend restorative, reparative and transformative
initiatives with the prosecution of paradigmatic violations of human rights. In the end,
blended solutions may promote... accountability..." Id.
Drumbl, in arguing that local mechanisms for resolving disputes should also be relied
upon when available, explained the use of gacaca in Rwanda. Gacaca is a form of extrajudicial dispute resolution that Rwandans have used for centuries to settle interpersonal
disputes within particular villages. Id. at 1263-66. Village leaders bring the opposing
parties together, and participation by all residents in the village is encouraged. Victims of
the crimes, along with others in the village, judge the alleged wrongdoer, and if found
responsible, this individual could face a range of penalties, including community service,
apologies, rituals, and public shaming. Id.; see also MINow, supra note 129, at 90 ("A truth
commission could generate the evidence to support prosecutions.").
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avoided or ameliorated for present and future generations. A Sudanese
truth commission, unlike a court or tribunal, does not necessarily have to
engage in the tasks of assigning blame on particular individuals for their
past conduct and punishing those individuals as a result of that conduct. As
a result, Sudanese actors themselves will be more likely to participate in a
truth commission and be more willing to include individuals from diverse
backgrounds in the work of the commission. The formation of a truth
commission in Sudan may be delayed until the local political climate
improves to the point that a commission reflecting a cross-section of
Sudanese society can be instituted. And, as suggested above, the scope of
the actual work of that commission may depend, in large part, on the ability
of the various segments of the post-conflict society to agree upon the
purposes and goals for the commission. For example, a more politically
fractured Sudanese post-conflict society may support a truth commission of
more limited dimensions. Such a commission may be restricted to
discovering relevant facts and generating recommendations as opposed to
identifying perpetrators for future prosecution. A more limited truth
commission, however, can still be a valuable mechanism for contributing to
reconciliation in Sudan.
D. EXECUTION OF ARREST WARRANTS FOR HARUN AND KUSHAYB
The case against Harun and Kushayb will not proceed to the Trial
Chamber of the ICC until the suspects appear before the Court in person,
probably as the result of successful execution of the arrest warrants issued
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The ICC relies on State Parties to execute arrest
warrants as it lacks its own police force. 139 Sudan has indicated that it does
not intend to execute the arrest warrants for either Harun or Kushayb issued
by the ICC despite its obligation to do so under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1593.140 The Pre-Trial Chamber's warrant decision included
139

"A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and

surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its
laws .... " Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(1); see also supra notes 104-06 (discussing
Sudan's and other non-State Party's obligation to execute the arrest warrants). The ICC's
situation is similar to that of the ICTR, which also lacks its own police force. The ICTR has
experienced difficulty in ensuring the appearance of suspects for trial. See Christina M.
Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with Mass Atrocities of
1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 173, 183 (2000) ("[Having no policing authority of its own, the
[Rwandan Tribunal] operates at the whim of other countries to produce suspects for
detention and trial.") (providing example of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, whom the United
States took four years to extradite to Tribunal headquarters in Tanzania).
140 See supra note 91 and accompanying text regarding Sudanese cooperation; supra
notes 80, 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sudan's obligation to cooperate
with the ICC under U.N. Security Resolution 1593.
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instructions for the Registry to transmit the requests for arrest to all State
Parties to the Rome Statute, the remaining non-State Party members of the
U.N. Security Council, and the nations bordering Sudan which are not party

to the Rome Statute. 141 Under the Rome Statute, State Parties receiving
these Registry requests for the arrest of Harun and Kushayb must honor
them.142 Along with a travel ban already in place from a previous U.N.
Security Council resolution, these requests143help ensure that Harun and
Kushayb will not flee Sudan to escape arrest.
The execution of previous arrest warrants issued by the ICC has had
mixed results. As of yet, none of the five warrants issued by the ICC in the
Uganda case have been executed successfully.1 44 The arrest warrants for
three ICC suspects in the DRC, however, have all been executed. Indeed,
the first successful arrest for the ICC came with the surrender of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC; this arrest was carried out by the government of
the DRC, and Lubanga was transferred to the Court via French military air
transport. The second and third successful arrests by the ICC came in
October of 2007 and February of 2008 in the DRC when Germain Katanga
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui were surrendered and transferred to the court
by Congolese authorities. 145 Cooperation by the DRC in the execution of

141

See supra note 106 for the text of the Pre-Trial Chamber's warrant decision regarding

transmission of these requests.
142 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(1) ("A State Party which has received a request
for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the
").Non-State Parties to the Rome Statute also have a responsibility
person in question ....
to comply with the requests for arrest in the Darfur conflict because U.N. Security
Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur case to the ICC, urged non-State Parties to
cooperate fully with the Court and Prosecutor. Of course, under this same Resolution, Sudan
must cooperate with the ICC's investigation in Darfur, including execution of arrest
warrants. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
143 "[A]ll States shall take the necessary measures to prevent entry into or transit through
their territories of all persons as designated by the Committee." S.C. Res. 1591, 3(d), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
144 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for further discussion regarding the
status of the ICC Uganda case.
145 On 17 March 2005, in Kinshasa, Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese national and
alleged founder and leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) was arrested and
transferred to the International Criminal Court as part of the judicial proceedings under the Rome
Statute (the "Statute").... As provided under article 59 of the Statute, Mr Lubanga appeared
before the competent judicial authority in Kinshasa. The Congolese authorities cooperated with
the Court in the spirit of the Statute by promptly executing its request.
Press Release, ICC, supra note 48. Germain Katanga's arrest was also explained in a recent
press release by the ICC. See Press Release, ICC, Second Arrest: Germain Katanga
transferred into the custody of the ICC (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://www.iccLikewise, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui's arrest recently
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/284.html.
appeared in an ICC press release. See Press Release, ICC, Statement by the Office of the

20081

ARGUING FOR ANINTEGRATED APPROACH

1109

these warrants appears to stem from both its obligation to assist the ICC as
a State Party to the Rome Statute and from its status as the party that
originally referred the human rights situation to the ICC.
In contrast to the DRC's assistance, it appears that Sudan, not a State
Party to the Rome Statute but still obligated to arrest Harun and Kushayb,
does not intend to do so. Sudan's lack of cooperation may reflect the fact
that unlike in the case of the DRC, Sudan did not refer the human rights
situation in its country to the ICC for investigation. Instead, an external
entity, the U.N., originally brought the situation in Sudan to the ICC's
attention. Sudan has gone so far as to recently take steps to protect the two
suspects from arrest. For example, Kushayb apparently has been released
from Sudanese custody, while Harun continues to serve as a high-level
government minister and even received a recent promotion. As ICC
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo indicated to the U.N. Security Council in his
June 2007 update, "[T]he Security Council and regional organizations must
take the lead in calling on the Sudan as the territorial State to arrest [Harun
and Kushayb]."' 46 The Prosecutor renewed this request for U.N. Security
Council assistance in arresting the two suspects in his latest report to the
Council in December 2007.147

In light of the fact that the Sudanese case was referred to the ICC by
the U.N. Security Council in the first place, and in accordance with the ICC
Prosecutor's request, the U.N. Security Council should serve as the starting
point for enforcement of the arrest warrants. It must first determine that the
continued refusal of the Sudanese government to execute the arrest warrants
for Kushayb and Harun, combined with that government's recent efforts to
Prosecutor Following the Transfer to the Hague of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/330.html.
146Fifth Report to the U.N. Security Council,supra note 104, at 12.
147See supra note 104 for the text of this statement from the Prosecutor in his Fifth
Report to U.N. Security Council. This request by the Prosecutor for U.N. Security Council
assistance with the arrest warrants was renewed most recently in December, 2007. See Sixth
Report to the UN. Security Council, supra note 3, at 15 ("The UN Security Council must
ensure compliance with UNSCR 1593 (2005) and the full and immediate cooperation of the
[Sudanese government] through the arrest and surrender of Ahmad Harun and Ali
Kushayb."). The Sixth Report to the U.N. Security Council also describes the Sudanese
government's recent lack of cooperation:
As reported before to the Security Council and in its application to the Court, the [Office of
the Prosecutor] had noted that "the Government of the Sudan ...has... provided a degree of
cooperation in response to the Prosecution's requests." That degree of cooperation no longer
exists. Instead of ensuring the arrests of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, the [Sudanese
government] has chosen to protect them. Ahmad Harun continues to serve as a [Sudanese]
Minister and has been granted additional responsibilities, including serving as Acting Minister

for Humanitarian Affairs.

Id. at 4. Kushayb has apparently been released from Sudanese custody. Id. at 5.
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protect Kushayb and Harun, represents a threat to international peace and
security pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.148 In particular, Harun's
continued role as Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as his recent
promotion, serve to perpetuate the abuse inflicted on victims by the
Janjaweed, prevent international relief organizations and NGOs from doing
their work, and generally threaten the security of the region, including the
camps of internally displaced persons as well as principal roadways.1 49 The
U.N. Security Council should communicate this determination in writing to
Sudan along with a reminder of its obligation to assist the ICC in all matters
related to the Darfur investigation, including the execution of arrest
warrants.
The U.N. Security Council should also explain to Sudan any direct,
non-military consequences for failing to execute the ICC warrants for
Harun and Kushayb, which may include economic sanctions, such as
restrictions on trade, monetary fines, limitations on air travel, or some other
penalty as permitted under the Council's Chapter 7 powers. 50 It should
include in its written communication a deadline for Sudan to hand over the
148 U.N. Charter art.

39. Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter states:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Id.
149 See Sixth Report to the U.N. Security Council, supra note 3, at 13-14 ("[Tlhe

information gathered points to an ongoing pattern of crimes against the persons displaced;
continued targeting and attacking of civilians in villages; aerial bombardments; attacks
against persons displaced; dire conditions of life within the camps; hindering delivery of
humanitarian assistance; continuing forcible transfers; resettlements on land belonging to
persons displaced. There are reasons to believe that Ahmad Harun still plays a critical role
in these events."). The Report continues:
The Ministry's own documents demonstrate how Ahmad Harun is responsible for providing
relief, for coordinating and controlling the work of NGOs, international relief and other
voluntary organizations, and for coordinating with relevant security organs to enhance the
security of roads and IDP camps. In essence, he shares responsibility for the security and wellbeing of the displaced population. As persons displaced continue to suffer constant abuses by
Militia/Janjawced and other [Sudanese government] agents, Ahmad Harun has done nothing to
ameliorate their situation. It is inferred that either he is directly involved in those activities or he
is entirely failing in his responsibility to take steps to prevent and put an end to those acts.
Ahmad Harun's presence is alleged during specific operations in IDP camps.

Id.
150 See U.N. Charter art. 41 ("The Security Council may decide what measures not

involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.").

2008]

ARGUING FOR ANINTEGRA TED APPROACH

1111

two suspects under the warrant. If Sudan fails to meet this deadline, and
shows no good faith efforts towards the successful execution of the
warrants, the U.N. Security Council should take additional action, including
the imposition of non-military penalties on Sudan under Chapter 7. All
members of the Council would, of course, need to agree on the application
of these penalties or sanctions to Sudan. Ostensibly, since they all agreed to
refer the Darfur case involving human rights violations to the ICC in the
first place, these same members would agree on the necessity of sanctions
to ensure that the alleged perpetrators of these violations are brought to
justice before the Court. Sanctions would help ensure Sudan's cooperation
in the enforcement of the ICC warrants for the two Darfur suspects,
Kushayb and Harun. In addition, the U.N. Security Council has recently
agreed on the use of economic, non-military sanctions in the context of
penalizing a nation for not abiding by certain pre-established obligations
related to nuclear weapons testing. 15 1 This would at least suggest
receptivity on the part of the Council to utilizing economic measures to
compel Sudan's compliance with its obligation to arrest the two suspects.
If Sudan fails to respond after a reasonable time to any U.N.-imposed
non-military penalty, then, and only then, should the U.N. consider the use
of force to execute the warrants under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. 52 In
particular, the U.N. Security Council should take the necessary measures to
equip the principal missions already in Sudan with the authority to use force
to execute the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb.153 The U.N. Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) consists of 10,000 military personnel from various U.N.

151

See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining U.N. Security Council approval

of economic sanctions against North Korea for violating certain rules and obligations related
to the testing of nuclear weapons).
152 See U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").
153 The U.N. Mission in Sudan's (UNMIS) forces could be mobilized under Chapter VII
powers of the U.N. Charter to ensure that the requirements of Resolution 1593 are fulfilled.
See supra notes 41, 152 for a description of Chapter VII powers of the U.N. Security
Council. See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Resolution 1593
(requiring the cooperation of Darfur and urging the cooperation of the AU and non-State
Parties in the Darfur investigation). Under the Rome Statute, the Court is permitted to
request the assistance of intergovernmental organizations such as the AU: "The Court may
ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or documents. The Court
may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with
such an organization and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate." Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 87(6).
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Member Countries. 5 4 In light of Sudan's apparent unwillingness to
cooperate, collaboration between the UNMIS and the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to execute the arrest warrants for Harun and
Kushayb may be the most effective method currently available to ensure the
appearance of Harun and Kushayb before the ICC.
Such collaboration has been facilitated by the recent creation of a joint,
or unified, mission in Sudan by the U.N. Security Council.1 55 Known as the
United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, this unified
mission currently consists of 9,080 total uniformed personnel from other
African, Asian, European, and North American countries.156 UNAMID's
current mandate does not specifically authorize it to execute the arrest
warrants for the two Sudanese suspects. However, since the mandate
encompasses the preservation of security and human rights in Sudan,1 57 and
since the non-arrest of the two named suspects certainly threatens both of
these matters, the U.N. Security Council would be justified in using its
powers under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter to authorize UNAMID to use
the necessary force to arrest Kushayb and Harun. Though unusual, this
would not be the first time that an intergovernmental organization was
58
called upon to enforce arrest warrants issued by an international court .
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, has

154 United Nations Mission in Sudan, Military Component, http://www.unmis.org/english
/military.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). UNMIS was established under U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1590. S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (2005). While the current
mission of the UNMIS is linked to the implementation of the comprehensive security peace
agreement in Sudan, the mission could be altered by further U.N. Security Council
resolutions. See id. for the stated details of the UNMIS mission objectives.
155 A joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur was authorized by UN
Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. The UN Security Council, acting under
Chapter ViI of the United Nations Charter, authorized UNAMID to take necessary action to
support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel
and civilians, without "prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan." The
Council decided that UNAMID shall start implementing its mandated tasks no later than 31
December 2007.

United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur,
http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unamid/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
156 Id.

157Id.

158 The only prior example of an intergovernmental organization making arrests for an
international tribunal is the work NATO has done in this regard for the ICTY. "NATO is the
only organization in modem history that has been directly involved on a significant scale in
the apprehension of persons indicted by an international criminal tribunal." Han-Ru Zhou,
The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by InternationalForces, 4 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 202,

204 (2006), availableat http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/reprint/4/2/202.
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assisted the ICTY in the past in arresting, detaining, and transferring
suspects to ICTY custody.' 5 9
Of course, all members of the U.N. Security Council must agree before
force could be used by U.N. troops to execute the warrants for the two
Darfur suspects. Such agreement is possible on this issue, however, in light
of the fact that the U.N. Security Council was able to agree in the first place
to refer the Darfur case to the ICC. Moreover, the Council has already
agreed on the presence of its troops in Sudan to both preserve and foster
human rights. The idea of using these same troops to enforce arrest
warrants in a case which was referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security
Council itself should not, under the circumstances, be met with objection by
individual U.N. Security Council members. If, for a particular reason,
certain members would not agree to this rather limited use of force by U.N.
troops, then AU troops could potentially be relied upon to execute the
warrants without the necessity of obtaining U.N. Security Council approval.
In addition to relying on an inter-governmental organization like the
U.N. or AU to enforce the arrest warrants for the Sudanese suspects, a State
Party to the ICC with the necessary resources might also be able to assist in
the capture of these suspects. For example, in the ICC case in the DRC,
one warrant was successfully executed with the help of French
authorities.16 Given the history of Sudan, perhaps France or another State
Party to the ICC that has historical ties to Sudan, such as Belgium or the
United Kingdom, could offer its assistance to Sudan to arrest the ICC
suspects. 16' What may make the State Party option less viable in Sudan,
however, is the lack of cooperation that Sudan itself has thus far displayed
with respect to executing the arrests. In the case of French assistance in
executing an ICC arrest warrant for a suspect in the DRC, the government
of the DRC cooperated in the execution of the warrant. Without Sudanese
permission, the French or any other State Party may be reluctant to enter
Sudanese territory to execute the warrants given the lack of respect for
Sudanese sovereignty such conduct would necessarily reflect. Of course, a
State Party that was inclined to assist the ICC in this way could justify its
actions related to execution of arrest warrants in Sudan by noting that under
159See supra note 158; see also Press Statement, NATO, On Signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding between Shape and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (May 9, 1996), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96074e.htm (explaining how ICTY and NATO have agreed upon certain arrangements for the
detention and transfer of suspects by NATO forces to ICTY).
160See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161Dr. Riek Machar, University of Pennsylvania-African Studies Center, South Sudan: A
History

of Political Domination-A

Case

of

Self-Determination, available

http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sdMachar.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).

at
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the ICC Statute, State Parties have a formal obligation to provide such
assistance. 161
Finally, the international police organization, Interpol, may be able to
play a role in the execution of the arrest warrants in Sudan. In fact, in the
December 2007 Report by the ICC Prosecutor to the U.N. Security Council,
a Sudanese official expressed concern that Interpol might facilitate the
execution of the arrest warrants in Sudan.1 63 Notably, Interpol or its agents
could not actually carry out arrests of individual suspects. Rather,
Interpol's principal function is to facilitate communication between national
police forces as well as between courts, including international tribunals,
and these forces. 164 One mechanism Interpol relies upon to facilitate this
communication is a "red notice," which publicizes the fact that an arrest
warrant has been issued by a national or international court for a particular
individual. Interpol has issued such red notices as a way of publicizing the
ICC warrants for the two Sudanese suspects.
Of course, if an Interpol Member State and its police forces wished to
execute an arrest warrant publicized by Interpol in the form of a red notice,
that State could request the assistance of Interpol. This assistance from
Interpol may include investigative services related to identifying and

162 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
163 Machar, supra note 161:
Sudan's Justice Minister Ali Al Mardi-who in June [2007] was quoted as saying that any
attempts to arrest Harun and Kushayb through Interpol would amount to kidnapping and
international piracy-reiterated on 2 October through the Sudanese Media Centre the [Sudanese
government's] refusal to surrender any Sudanese, stating that the Sudanese judiciary is capable
of holding accountable all of those who violate internal laws.
164 See, e.g., James Sheptycki, The Accountability of TransnationalPolicingInstitutions:
The Strange Case ofInterpol, in GLOBAL CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CURRENT
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 247, 254 (Nick Larsen and Russell Smandych eds., 2008):
Interpol facilitates the transnational police mission by providing channels of communication
between police agencies in its 181 member countries. Interpol itself has no operational role. The
man from Interpol never arrested anyone. Having no operational capacity, it cannot initiate
investigations or undertake judicial enquiries on its own behalf. Interpol's primary role is
facilitating the exchange of messages-for example requests for information about a given
person's criminal history or requests that enquiries be undertaken-between police and judicial
authorities of the member countries. The organization uses a system of coloured "notices" to
facilitate police-to-police communication. Red notices amount to a worldwide diffusion of
national arrest warrants and could therefore be viewed as a semi-official international arrest
warrant.
The Interpol Red Notice for Harun can be found at INTERPOL, Harun, Ahmad
Muhammad,
http://www.interpol.int/public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/2007/10/2007
281 10.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). The Interpol Red Notice for Kushyab can be found at
INTERPOL,
Abd
A1-Rahman,
Ali
Muhammad
Ali,
http://www.interpol.int
/public/Data/Wanted/Notices/Data/2007/92/2007_43292.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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locating individual suspects.1 65 Sudan, though a member of Interpol,166 is

unlikely to request this assistance for Harun and Kushayb given its past
unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC in arresting these individuals.
Another Interpol Member State, in particular those Member States that are
also State Parties to the ICC, may wish to consider requesting this
assistance from Interpol. 167 In this way, an individual Interpol Member
State or group of such States would actually carry out the arrests while
relying upon, as necessary, the logistical assistance of Interpol. In fact,
Interpol itself has recommended that its members assist each other as well
as international tribunals in the apprehension of war criminals. 168 Finally,
the ICC, as part of its formal relationship with Interpol, 169 should seriously
These Red notices "[have] been recognised in a number of countries as having the legal
value to serve as a basis for provisional arrest."
See Interpol, Wanted,
http://www.interpol.int/Public[Wanted/fugitivelnvestServ.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
165 Interpol created the Fugitive Investigative Service to offer more proactive and
systematic assistance to member countries by:
• providing investigative support to member countries in ongoing international fugitive
investigations with a view to locating and arresting wanted persons;
" co-ordinating and-enhancing international co-operation in the field of fugitive investigations;
" collecting and disseminating best practice and expert knowledge;
" conducting and co-ordinating relevant research and serve as a global point of reference for
fugitive-related information.
Id.
166

For a list of the 186 Interpol member countries, including Sudan, see INTERPOL,

List of Member States, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/Members/default.asp (last visited
Sept. 8, 2008).
1"67For example, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium are Interpol members as well
as ICC State Parties. For a complete list of Interpol members, see id. For a list of ICC State
parties, see International Criminal Court, State Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
168 See Increased ICPO-Interpol support for the investigation and prosecution of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, Resolution No AG-2004-RES-17,
available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/AGN73/resolutions
/AGN73RES17.asp (The Interpol General Assembly "RECOMMENDS that, within the
limits of national and international law, ICPO-Interpol member countries co-operate with
each other and with international organizations, international criminal tribunals, and nongovernmental organizations as appropriate in a joint effort to prevent genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity, and to investigate and prosecute those suspected of committing
these crimes[.]").
169 See Co-operation agreement between the office of the prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court and the International Criminal Police Organization-Interpol, available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegaiMaterials/cooperation/agreements/ICC2005.asp,
at Art. 5 ("Other assistance from Interpol"): "The ICC-OTP may seek the expertise of the
Interpol General Secretariat's specialized staff, in particular in matters related to the search
for fugitives and to criminal analysis, subject to any provisions of confidentiality which may
prove necessary and within the limits of available resources."
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consider requesting assistance from this organization in executing the
warrants for Harun and Kushayb. Such action by Interpol members without
Sudanese consent would technically be an infringement on Sudanese
sovereignty, but might be justified by the fact that Sudan, as an Interpol
member, has a responsibility to assist in the apprehension of war criminals,
a responsibility that it has clearly not lived up to in the case of the two
Darfur suspects.
In sum, execution of the arrest warrants in Sudan may result from a
combination of efforts by Interpol, intergovernmental organizations like the
U.N. and AU, and certain ICC Member States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002 amid high aspirations for
the new level of responsibility being placed on international tribunals for
the enforcement of international criminal law norms. Given the relative
infancy of the ICC, the Darfur case is poised to set significant precedent.
The developing case is already providing a better understanding of the
application of the Rome Statute's complementarity principle. And, if the
case against Harun and Kushayb proceeds to trial, the case will certainly
have an impact in future international war crimes trials for similar crimes,
be they future ICC cases or future proceedings in ad hoc tribunals such as
the ICTY and ICTR.
The Court's assertion of jurisdiction over the case in Darfur is an
important step in seeing that justice is served for the horrific atrocities
committed by government officials and their affiliated militia fighters in the
Janjaweed. The half-hearted efforts thus far by the Sudanese judicial
system with Special Court proceedings will not prevent the international
community, acting through the ICC, from responding to the atrocities
committed in Darfur by Kushayb, Harun, and others. In short, the
complementarity principle has not been violated, and the ICC may proceed
with trying the case. However, efforts should be encouraged to improve the
functionality and effectiveness of the special courts in Darfur to handle the
high number of low-level prosecutions that need to be processed as a result
of the atrocities. The ICC could then focus its efforts on the individuals
who orchestrated and carried out the killings and other atrocities against
civilians in Darfur. Also, a truth commission combined with local
mechanisms such as Diya and judiyya may also prove useful in responding
to the crisis in Darfur.
The issuance of arrest warrants by the ICC for Harun and Kushayb is a
large step towards resolving the conflict in Darfur. The execution of the
arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb poses a particular challenge in light
of the Sudanese government's current refusal to cooperate. If either suspect
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attempts to flee the country, the surrounding nations have been requested to
arrest and surrender them to the ICC. The best chance of effecting the
arrests within Sudan without the cooperation of the Sudanese government is
for the U.N. Security Council to give authority to UNAMID, the joint U.N.AU mission in Sudan, to arrest the two suspects. If the U.N. Security
Council is unable to convey such authority on UNAMID, then the AU or an
ICC Member State, with the assistance of Interpol, should take steps to
execute the arrest warrants.
In the interest of justice, the ICC must continue to act to uncover the
truth of the criminal violations that have occurred in Darfur, end the culture
of impunity, and promote reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing among
the surviving population. 70 Despite the movement in the ICC on the case,
the crimes in Darfur continue to occur and millions of people are still dying
in the refugee camps. The Janjaweed is still operating and threatens the
lives of humanitarian aid workers trying to help in Darfur. 171 In light of the
170

Uncovering the truth behind actions and events occurring in a human rights crisis as

well as promoting reconciliation, healing, and forgiveness in a post-crisis society may not
come from national and international prosecutions alone; truth commissions may also
contribute to these goals. See HAYNER, supra note 133, at 609. Hayner suggests that the
reason truth commissions lessen the likelihood of future human rights violations may be
because of their publishing of a reliable record of these violations "with the hope that a more
knowledgeable citizenry will recognize and resist any sign of return to repressive rule." Id.
Martha Minow posits that truth commissions may actually be better than trials in producing
"a coherent, if complex narrative, about [an] entire nation's trauma, and the multiple sources
and expressions of its violence." See Minow, supra note 129, at 58, 78. On the other hand,
"trial records do not seek a full historical account beyond the action of particular
individuals." Id. at 78. However, truth commissions, through:
[C]lose historical analysis of testimony and documents [exposing] the influences of [various
can do more than verdicts of guilt or innocence to
factors in causing the mass violence] ...
produce a record for the nation and world, and a recasting of the past to develop bases for
preventing future atrocities.
Id. at 79. Finally, Minow argues that "when the societal goals include restoring dignity to
victims, offering a basis for individual healing, and also promoting reconciliation across a
divided nation, a truth commission again may be as powerful as or more powerful than
prosecutions." Id. at 89. But see HAYNER, supra note 133, at 609 (pointing out that some
scholars have argued that commissions can "create deeper resentment and exacerbate old
issues that have been dug up anew"). See also KENNETH CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN
TRUTH COMMISSION 62 (Palgrave 2000) (quoting RAYNER, supra note 133 ("A Truth
Commission can play an important role in transition, either by affirming a real commitment
to change in the human rights practices of a government and respect for the rule of law in the
country, or by helping to legitimize or strengthen the authority and popularity of a new head
of state or both.")). Local mechanisms may also help to uncover details of events in a
human rights crisis. See supra note 137 for a description of such mechanisms in place in the
Sudan.
171UNMIS, Report of the Security Council Mission to the Sudan and Chad, 4-10 June
2006, S/2006/433, at 12, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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ongoing crisis, additional work needs to be done on the part of the
international community as a whole, and the ICC in particular, to quell the
violence in Darfur.

